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Anthony J. Colangelo 
ABSTRACT—For too long, state interests have dominated public 
jurisdiction and private choice of law analyses regarding the reach and 
application of a state’s law, or prescriptive jurisdiction. Individual rights—
whether of criminal defendants or private litigants—have been 
marginalized. Yet states are projecting regulatory power over actors abroad 
with unprecedented frequency and aggression. State interest analyses 
proceed from the perennially critiqued but remarkably sticky concept of 
sovereignty. Now more than ever, legal thinkers, courts, and litigants need a 
bedrock concept from which to build individual rights arguments against 
jurisdictional overreach. And it should be one that holds not only theoretical 
cogency but also the promise of real-world traction in cases. 
This Article introduces the concept of spatial legality. It recasts the 
familiar and deeply rooted notion of legality—that is, the idea of fair notice 
of the law—along spatial as well as temporal dimensions. Operating in 
time, legality vindicates individual rights, for example by prohibiting ex 
post facto laws. Spatial legality focuses on law’s reach in space rather than 
its existence in time, but the problem is essentially the same: someone is 
being subjected to a law he could not reasonably have expected would 
govern his conduct when he engaged in it. 
The Article begins by taking extant rules of jurisdiction in multistate 
systems and transforming them through the concept of spatial legality into a 
right to fair notice of the law applicable at the time of conduct. It then 
shows how a jurisdictional mix-up metastasizing in both U.S. and 
international law is presently aggravating spatial legality problems: namely, 
the use of personal jurisdiction over parties to bootstrap application of 
substantive law to their extraterritorial conduct. The mix-up occurs (1) on 
the criminal side, by using a defendant’s postconduct presence in the forum 
to justify applying substantive law to prior conduct outside the forum, and 
(2) on the civil side, by using “general” personal jurisdiction over parties to 
justify applying forum law to activity outside the forum. Reorienting 
jurisdictional doctrine around the rights of parties instead of states generates 
important doctrinal and litigation payoffs: it clarifies and straightens out the 
law for courts and, where courts do err, supplies parties with rights-based 
arguments to challenge such errors as opposed to state-based arguments 
about sovereignty and comity. In this connection, the Article proposes a 
typology that weaves together public jurisdiction and private choice of law 
doctrines to identify how and when spatial legality claims will have the 
most traction on the current state of the law. It concludes by indicating the 
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limits of a spatial legality concept based only on notice and suggests other 
rule of law criteria like feasibility of compliance, avoidance of 
contradictory laws, and consistency that, going forward, may further inform 
analysis of the demands multistate systems with overlapping laws place on 
fundamental fairness. 
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The principle of legality constitutes a central pillar of any sophisticated 
legal system.1 Its traditional Latin formulation is “nullum crimen sine lege, 
nulla poena sine lege,” or “no crime without law, nor punishment without 
law.”2 At its most basic, the idea is that conduct cannot be subjected to a 
legal rule without adequate notice that the rule applies at the time of the 
conduct.3 To violate the principle not only would be unfair in a particular 
case, it also would undermine the legal system itself. Indeed, the principle 
plunges to the root legitimacy of law: if people cannot predict how law will 
 
1  The principle “dates from the ancient Greeks” and is one of the most “widely held value-
judgment[s] in the entire history of human thought.” JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL 
LAW 59 (photo. reprint 2005) (2d ed. 1960). 
2  Paul H. Robinson, Fair Notice and Fair Adjudication: Two Kinds of Legality, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 
335, 336 (2005). 
3  The principle is about adequate notice of an applicable law and not merely the existence of a law. 
Imagine a legislature passed a secret law. The law would exist, but its application would violate the 
principle of legality in the same way, and for the same reasons, as if there were no law at the time of the 
conduct. See KENNETH S. GALLANT, THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY IN INTERNATIONAL AND 
COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW 20 (2009) (“Notice requires not only that a law has been in existence but 
also that it has been applicable to the actor at the time of the act.”). Also, for purposes of this Article, I 
put to the side the related doctrine of void for vagueness, which also triggers fair notice problems. See 
John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 
189, 196 (1985) (describing the relationship between the void for vagueness and legality principles); see 
also Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2718 (2010) (“A conviction fails to comport 
with due process if the statute under which it is obtained fails to provide a person of ordinary 
intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, or is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages 
seriously discriminatory enforcement.” (quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008))); 
Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (“[A] statute which either forbids or requires the 
doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning 
and differ as to its application, violates the first essential [element] of due process of law.”). 
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treat their behavior, law in turn loses legitimacy and effectiveness as a tool 
for shaping behavior.4 Put another way, the less I am able to predict how the 
law will treat my behavior, the less incentive I have to conform my 
behavior to the law. It follows that how the law does end up treating my 
behavior is going to be arbitrary, chipping away at law’s legitimacy over 
time. The more cases that fail to uphold the principle of legality, the more 
the rule of law crumbles within a given legal community.5 
Lawyers typically think of legality along temporal dimensions.6 For 
instance, it would violate the principle of legality if today State A passed a 
law prohibiting activity X and that law purported to reach back in time to 
apply to X committed by State A persons yesterday and punish them for it. 
Such an application of the law would be plainly ex post facto.7 This Article 
argues that legality may also operate along spatial dimensions.8 Suppose 
instead that State A gains custody of an individual and purports to extend 
State A law to conduct he committed in State B. If State A did not have 
jurisdiction to regulate his conduct at the time it occurred—even if State A’s 
law was on the books—there is a legality problem. That is to say, 
application of State A law to conduct State A could not regulate when it 
occurred would also be ex post facto. Conceptually speaking, the principle 
of spatial legality focuses on law’s reach or application in space rather than 
on its existence in time, but the problem is essentially the same: someone is 
 
4  GALLANT, supra note 3, at 22–24; see also Beth Van Schaak, Crimen Sine Lege: Judicial 
Lawmaking at the Intersection of Law and Morals, 97 GEO. L.J. 119, 145–46 (2008). For an analysis of 
legality with respect to punishment, see Shahram Dana, Beyond Retroactivity to Realizing Justice: A 
Theory on the Principle of Legality in International Criminal Law Sentencing, 99 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 857, 864–66 (2009). 
5  LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39 (rev. ed. 1969); GALLANT, supra note 3, at 15; see 
also Jeffries, supra note 3, at 212 (“The most important concern underlying nulla poena sine lege . . . is 
the so-called ‘rule of law.’ . . . The rule of law signifies the constraint of arbitrariness in the exercise of 
government power.”). Of course, scholars have identified many other features of the rule of law as well 
as many theories of compliance, most of which are outside the scope of this Article. The point here is 
only that legality is important to the rule of law as conventionally understood. See, e.g., Jeremy 
Waldron, The Rule of Law and the Importance of Procedure, in NOMOS L: GETTING TO THE RULE OF 
LAW 3, 4–6 (James E. Fleming ed., 2011) (including prospectivity as a staple formal element of the rule 
of law). 
6  See, e.g., Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 354 (1964) (recounting “[t]he fundamental 
principle that the required criminal law must have existed when the conduct in issue occurred” (internal 
quotation mark omitted)). 
7  Ex post facto translates to “from a thing done afterward,” or “[a]fter the fact; retroactively.” 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 661 (9th ed. 2009); see also, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390–
92 (1798) (“[A] law shall not be passed concerning, and after the fact, or thing done, or action 
committed.”). 
8  For previous discussions linking legality and jurisdiction, see Anthony J. Colangelo, Universal 
Jurisdiction as an International “False Conflict” of Laws, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 881, 909–16 (2009) 
[hereinafter Colangelo, False Conflict]; Anthony J. Colangelo, Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction: Terrorism and the Intersection of National and International Law, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 
121, 166 (2007) [hereinafter Colangelo, Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction]; and 
GALLANT, supra note 3, at 407–08. 
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being subjected to a law he could not reasonably have expected would 
govern his behavior when he engaged in it. While other links such as 
national citizenship or allegiance can and do put individuals on notice that a 
particular state’s law may apply to them, geographic space remains for 
better or worse the primary organizing principle of jurisdictional 
competences in multistate systems,9 and I therefore use it as the conceptual 
baseline for my approach and build out from there. 
Spatial legality problems are being aggravated now more than ever by 
an increase in extraterritorial jurisdiction, or the assertion of legal power by 
states over conduct outside their borders. And one doctrinal snarl in 
particular is the main culprit: across different types of cases—criminal, 
civil, U.S., and international—states are using jurisdiction to adjudicate a 
case in order to bootstrap jurisdiction to apply substantive law to that case.10 
Thus in criminal cases, U.S. courts have applied U.S. law to entirely foreign 
activity based on the subsequent presence of the accused in U.S. territory. 
And on the civil side, where the problem is often styled as a due process 
objection, U.S. courts have mixed up personal jurisdiction tests with choice 
of law tests, for example using general jurisdiction to subject a corporation 
to suit in a U.S. forum (say, where the corporation has U.S. offices) in order 
to apply U.S. law to the corporation’s wholly foreign activities. This trend 
promises to sweep across the litigation landscape in U.S. state courts as 
well, as plaintiffs bring suits seeking application of state law to human 
rights abuses abroad.11 U.S. courts are not alone. Judges on the International 
Court of Justice have also used this technique to suggest that the presence 
of the accused in a state predicates that state’s exercise of what is called 
“universal jurisdiction” over conduct with no connection at all to the state. 
In each of these scenarios, the links connecting the defendant to the 
forum—whether physical presence or “minimum contacts”—establish 
personal jurisdiction, a form of adjudicative jurisdiction. By adjudicative 
jurisdiction, I mean the authority of the forum to subject the defendant to 
judicial process. Yet as I will show, just because a state gains adjudicative 
jurisdiction over a defendant does not necessarily mean the state has 
prescriptive jurisdiction, or the ability to apply its laws to the defendant’s 
conduct. In particular, if the state had no prescriptive jurisdiction over the 
conduct when the defendant engaged in it, there would be a spatial legality 
problem since the defendant could not reasonably have expected the state’s 
law to apply at the time of conduct. In short, spatial legality precludes using 
adjudicative jurisdiction over a defendant to bootstrap prescriptive 
 
9  See, e.g., Dino Kritsiotis, Public International Law and Its Territorial Imperative, 30 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 547, 547–48 (2009). 
10  The term “bootstrap” originally “was one among several variants of to pull oneself up by one’s 
bootstraps (a futile effort).” GARNER’S DICTIONARY OF LEGAL USAGE 117 (3d ed. 2011). 
11  See, e.g., Donald Earl Childress III, The Alien Tort Statute, Federalism, and the Next Wave of 
Transnational Litigation, 100 GEO. L.J. 709, 739 (2012). 
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jurisdiction over everything that defendant has ever done—specifically, 
activity the state had no prescriptive jurisdiction to regulate when it 
occurred. 
Of course, none of this would really matter if the state could override 
legality deficiencies: that is, if legality were merely an admirable but 
abstract principle of justice that nonetheless bows to sovereign power in the 
end. Whether legality constrains sovereignty is a question with a loaded 
pedigree.12 And in line with traditional conceptions, it has focused mainly 
on the sovereign’s power in time, namely, the power to enact laws 
prohibiting activity after it occurs.13 But spatial legality adds another 
dimension. Because it operates in space, it limits sovereignty not only as an 
abstract principle of justice but also as a matter of the sovereignties of other 
states. To return to our two-state hypothetical, absent a basis for prescribing 
law over a defendant’s conduct in State B when it occurs, State A may not 
apply its law to the State B conduct even if State A gains adjudicative 
(personal) jurisdiction over the defendant at some later point. This is a 
matter not only of the rights of the defendant, but also of the sovereignty of 
State B. By applying State A law to the defendant’s past State B conduct, 
State A retroactively projects its law into State B’s territory in a way that 
exceeds State A’s prescriptive jurisdiction under international law, thereby 
infringing State B’s sovereignty. 
In this way, spatial legality rethinks and marries individual rights and 
sovereignty concepts that are often cast in opposition, such that enlarging 
one reduces the other. Temporal legality is emblematic of this perceived 
tradeoff: on the one hand, if legality protects individual rights to fair notice, 
the sovereign power to enforce retroactive law is weakened. On the other 
hand, if sovereignty overrides legality, the individual’s right to fair notice is 
weakened. By contrast, spatial legality uses the mutually reinforcing power 
and forbearance norms by definition extant in multistate systems comprised 
of coequal sovereigns to shore up individual rights. 
And here the concept packs important doctrinal payoffs and litigation 
value: by transforming jurisdictional rules among sovereigns at the time an 
individual acts into a fair notice right about what law potentially may apply 
to his activity, spatial legality both clarifies the law for courts and 
lawmakers and supplies parties with ways to enforce it. The concept 
highlights the error of using adjudicative jurisdiction over parties to 
bootstrap prescriptive jurisdiction over their extraterritorial conduct by 
distinguishing clearly between notice of the applicable law and notice of 
where a party may be subject to suit. Moreover, unlike state-centered 
doctrines, spatial legality gives parties viable legal arguments to challenge 
 
12  See, e.g., United States v. Göring, Judgment (1946), in 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS 
BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 171, 219 (1947) (“[T]he maxim nullum crimen sine 
lege is not a limitation of sovereignty, but is in general a principle of justice.”). 
13  See, e.g., id. 
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such mix-ups. For example, a major hurdle parties have faced thus far in 
challenging jurisdictional overreach has been that they simply have no legal 
basis on which to mount such challenges. Thus, a defendant in U.S. court 
may argue that the unexpected application of a U.S. statute to his conduct 
abroad violates international law; but if the U.S. statute applies by its 
terms—say the statute explicitly uses the defendant’s postconduct presence 
in the United States as a jurisdictional hook14—his argument is immaterial 
because Congress may override international law.15 Only by transforming 
the challenge into an individual rights argument can it have any hope of 
succeeding. I argue that that is exactly what spatial legality does through the 
Due Process Clause. 
A couple of qualifications are probably in order at this point. One is 
that this Article does not attempt to resolve overarching questions about the 
permissibility of retroactivity in the law generally.16 My aim instead is to 
persuade the reader that to the extent some retroactivity is impermissible in 
time, that nonretroactivity norm ought to extend across space too, and to 
offer ways of analyzing and evaluating such claims. Another qualification is 
that the concept of spatial legality does not preclude states from altering 
jurisdictional rules among themselves prospectively; rather, it is the 
retrospective alteration of rules subjecting parties to a law they could not 
have expected would govern their conduct when it occurred that is the 
Article’s key concern. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I elaborates the concept of spatial 
legality. It emphasizes a critical difference between exercises of 
adjudicative and prescriptive jurisdiction in multistate systems and focuses 
on two main scenarios in which courts are mixing up the law: (1) on the 
criminal side, using a defendant’s postconduct presence in the forum to 
justify the application of forum law to that defendant’s prior extraterritorial 
conduct and (2) on the civil side, using “general” personal jurisdiction—or 
jurisdiction based on the defendant’s contacts with the forum unrelated to 
the specific issue being litigated—to apply forum law to suits involving 
 
14  See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 960a(b)(5) (2006) (“There is jurisdiction over an offense under this section 
if . . . after the conduct required for the offense occurs an offender is brought into or found in the United 
States, even if the conduct required for the offense occurs outside the United States.”). 
15  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 115(1)(a) 
(1987) (“An act of Congress supersedes an earlier rule of international law or a provision of an 
international agreement as law of the United States if the purpose of the act to supersede the earlier rule 
or provision is clear or if the act and the earlier rule or provision cannot be fairly reconciled.”); see also, 
e.g., United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 92 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Yousef argues that this statute cannot 
give rise to jurisdiction because his prosecution thereunder conflicts with established principles of 
customary international law. Yousef’s argument fails because, while customary international law may 
inform the judgment of our courts in an appropriate case, it cannot alter or constrain the making of law 
by the political branches of the government as ordained by the Constitution.”). 
16  A degree of retroactivity may sometimes be necessary for the law to function effectively. 
Generally speaking, for example, retroactivity is more acceptable in civil suits. Indeed, the overruling of 
precedent retroactively applies the new rule to one of the civil litigants. See FULLER, supra note 5, at 57. 
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activities or transactions outside the forum. Part II recasts sovereignty in 
terms of jurisdiction to give it some analytical heft in this context and 
explains why violations of spatial legality generally but not always imply 
violations of sovereignty. 
Part III draws together private choice of law and public jurisdiction 
doctrine to develop a typology for evaluating when and why spatial legality 
claims will have the most bite on the current state of the law. It adapts in 
part modern choice of law nomenclature for describing choice of law 
dilemmas according to state interests and reorients the terminology around 
individual rights considerations to construct four main categories: 
(1) “absolute conflicts” of law, where forum law prohibits what foreign law 
in the place where conduct occurs requires; (2) “true conflicts” of law, 
where forum law prohibits what foreign law in the place where conduct 
occurs permits (but does not require); (3) “false conflicts” of law, where 
forum law and foreign law in the place where conduct occurs are distinct 
laws but reflect substantially the same rule; and (4) “harmonization” of law, 
where forum law and foreign law in the place where conduct occurs are 
fundamentally the same law. I argue that a spatial legality claim moves 
from strongest to weakest along these four categories. 
The Article concludes by indicating limits to a spatial legality analysis 
that considers only fair notice. Because fair notice of the law is essentially a 
function of what the law provides, the inquiry can prove circular. Spatial 
legality seeks to break the circle by effectively freezing jurisdictional rules 
at the time of conduct; so long as every state’s law does not apply 
everywhere, the concept will have some purchase. In this respect, the 
Article uses geographic space and attendant notions of sovereignty in 
multistate systems not as a priori principles but rather as generally 
recognized descriptors of jurisdictional allocations on which human beings 
may rely in planning their behavior. Yet in an increasingly shrinking world 
with an increasing amount of jurisdictional overlap, more and more 
activities promise to come under more and more laws. Indeed in theory, 
notice could be satisfied by states simply announcing their laws applicable 
everywhere.17 In this connection, I suggest that the typology in Part III may 
 
17  This has not happened as a general matter. Certain areas, like combating drug trafficking, 
cybercrime, terrorism, and serious human rights abuses, have witnessed pushes in this direction, though 
usually there is either some connection to the state seeking to regulate, see, e.g., United States v. Ivanov, 
175 F. Supp. 2d 367, 367–70 (D. Conn. 2001) (prosecution of foreign hackers operating abroad for 
targeting computer systems in the United States), or the activity is subject not only to national law but 
also to an international law by virtue of treaty or customary law already applicable to the conduct when 
and where it occurred, see, e.g., Yousef, 327 F.3d at 108–10 (upholding jurisdiction over foreign plane 
bombing under treaty law), thereby erasing any fair notice problem. I discuss this latter situation—and 
particularly the principle of universal jurisdiction—in more detail in Parts I.A and III.D respectively. 
Moreover, when states project purely national law abroad in a way not contemplated by existing 
jurisdictional rules of international law, it seems to me that defendants cannot be deemed on notice of 
that law without some factual showing, and accordingly may still be able to challenge the law “as 
applied” to them. See Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 STAN. L. REV. 
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open up analysis of other rule of law criteria for evaluating situations of 
jurisdictional overlap, like feasibility of compliance, avoidance of 
contradictory laws, and consistency of the law. 
I. SPATIAL LEGALITY 
Legality is generally thought of in terms of time.18 The natural reading 
of “no crime without law” implies that unless there is a law in existence 
prohibiting an activity at the time it occurs, the activity cannot be illegal. If 
we were to plot the principle in a purely temporal way, it might look 
something like Figure 1 below, with X representing the activity subject to 
regulation: 
FIGURE 1: TEMPORAL LEGALITY 
               State A then---------------------|----------------------|-------------------State A now 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
Does not violate legality:        law against X         X 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
Violates legality:         X        law against X 
If the law precedes the commission of X in time (top line), there is no 
problem. But if the commission of X precedes the law (bottom line), there 
was no law in existence prohibiting X when it took place, creating a legality 
problem. 
The concept of spatial legality works much the same way, but its focus 
is on the reach of law in space as opposed to its existence in time. Instead of 
just one state, State A, where State A law indubitably applies, the 
international system comprises multiple states and limits the spatial reach of 
their laws. To plot it, we therefore must posit more than one state. We can 
start with State A and State B. As long as State A law does not apply to 
every activity everywhere in the world, spatial legality comes into play. 
Consider the situation where State A law prohibits X but does not reach 
X inside State B—perhaps because X involves only State B persons acting 
in State B. Under international law, State A has no basis to apply State A 
law to this activity,19 just as, for example, Germany has no basis to apply 
German hate speech laws to U.S. nationals speaking to other U.S. nationals 
 
1209, 1232–35 (2010) (powerfully critiquing the imprecision of “facial” and “as-applied” challenges but 
explaining that “[u]nder current doctrine, an ‘as-applied challenge’ is somehow narrower, turning on the 
challenger’s specific facts and implying a remedy tailored to those facts”). 
18  See Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 354 (1964) (recounting “[t]he fundamental 
principle that the required criminal law must have existed when the conduct in issue occurred” (internal 
quotation mark omitted)). 
19  See infra text accompanying notes 22–25 (outlining principles of jurisdiction in international 
law). An exception would be where X is a universal jurisdiction offense under international law, a 
scenario discussed infra Part III.D. 
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in the United States. We therefore have the following situation, represented 
by Figure 2, when X takes place: 










A spatial legality problem arises where State A gains custody of 
someone who engaged in X outside of State A and seeks to prosecute. For 
present purposes, let’s say that X occurred in State B. This might be 
represented by Figure 3: 










Under international law, State A can claim adjudicative jurisdiction, or 
jurisdiction to subject persons in State A territory to judicial process.20 State 
A might do so, for instance, in order to extradite a person back to State B.21 
International law does not render State A’s courts powerless to resolve such 
issues. Naturally State A may also employ its adjudicative jurisdiction to 
apply State A law to the individual—but only for activity over which State 
A had prescriptive jurisdiction to begin with. Under international law, states 
may exercise prescriptive jurisdiction over acts that occur in their territories 
as well as acts that have, or are intended to have, effects within their 
territories.22 States may also assert jurisdiction over acts by their nationals 
 
20  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 421(2)(a) (1987). 
21  This scenario would occur, for example, if State A and State B were parties to an extradition 
treaty. See id. § 475. 
22  Id. § 402(1)(a), (c). 





Law against X  





Then: Law against X 
Now: Custody of 
person who engaged 
in X in State B  
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abroad, as well as acts against their nationals in some circumstances.23 
Further, under the protective principle, states may claim jurisdiction over 
acts abroad that threaten “the security of the state or other offenses 
threatening the integrity of governmental functions,” like espionage or 
counterfeiting the state’s currency.24 And universal jurisdiction grants all 
states jurisdiction over certain especially harmful offenses against 
international law.25 
Thus, if a State B national committed X in State A, State A courts 
clearly could apply State A law prohibiting X to that person, the same way a 
German court could apply German hate speech laws to a U.S. national 
speaking in Germany. But absent the initial authority to regulate activity as 
a matter of prescriptive jurisdiction, the existence of adjudicative 
jurisdiction at some later point does not retroactively bring within the 
compass of State A’s laws everything ever done outside State A by an 
individual now in State A custody—such as acts in State B over which State 
A lacked prescriptive jurisdiction when they occurred.26 In terms of Figure 
3, adding the line giving State A adjudicative jurisdiction (now) over the 
individual who committed X (then) does not alter the lack of State A 
prescriptive jurisdiction to apply State A law to X in the first instance. 
This may all seem a little abstract, but we can easily translate it to 
concrete issues of extraterritorial jurisdiction in both U.S. and international 
law by looking at actual cases. Doing so also reveals that the problem is not 
limited to criminal cases; it can afflict civil cases too, at least in U.S. courts, 
since the Due Process Clause of the Constitution protects parties’ 
expectations about what law applies to activity in both the criminal and the 
civil choice of law contexts.27 Before turning to the cases in sections A and 
 
23  Id. § 402(2), (3), cmts. e & g. 
24  Id. § 402(3), cmt. f. 
25  I discuss this principle in more depth infra Part III.D. 
26  See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 311 (7th ed. 2008) 
(“There is . . . no essential distinction between the legal bases for and limits upon substantive (or 
legislative) jurisdiction, on the one hand, and, on the other, enforcement (or personal, or prerogative) 
jurisdiction. The one is a function of the other. If the substantive jurisdiction is beyond lawful limits, 
then any consequent enforcement jurisdiction is unlawful.” (footnote omitted)). 
27  See infra notes 35–39 and accompanying text (setting out due process limits on choice of law). 
As to temporal legality, while the Supreme Court has construed the Constitution’s express prohibitions 
on ex post facto laws to apply only to criminal statutes, see Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390–91 
(1798), due process places limits on retroactive civil statutes as well, see, e.g., Pension Benefit Guar. 
Corp. v. R. A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 728–30 (1984); id. at 730 (“[R]etroactive aspects of legislation 
[imposing withdrawal liability on employers participating in a pension plan] . . . must meet the test of 
due process . . . .”); id. at 733 (“[R]etrospective civil legislation may offend due process if it is 
particularly harsh and oppressive . . . .” (quoting U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 17, n.13 
(1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 17 (1976) 
(“The retrospective aspects of legislation, as well as the prospective aspects, must meet the test of due 
process, and the justifications for the latter may not suffice for the former.”). The source of these limits 
has more recently become a matter of some debate. A plurality of the Court in Eastern Enterprises v. 
Apfel found the Takings Clause to place limits on retroactive civil legislation by virtue of the 
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B below, it is worth threading together fair notice doctrines from these 
traditionally separate criminal and civil contexts to demonstrate how due 
process can offer an especially fertile vehicle for analyzing and ultimately 
making spatial legality claims on the current state of the law. 
In the criminal context, the Supreme Court has used due process to 
invalidate retroactive application of statutory constructions that defeat 
parties’ expectations.28 Bouie v. City of Columbia held that “[i]f a judicial 
construction of a criminal statute is ‘unexpected and indefensible by 
reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct in 
issue,’ it must not be given retroactive effect.”29 Bouie struck down the 
South Carolina Supreme Court’s unanticipated construction of a South 
Carolina trespass statute.30 In this respect, due process ensures fair notice of 
the applicable law in time: the law—or here, the construction of the law—
must exist before it can apply. 
What about fair notice of the applicable law in space? Bouie had 
something to say here as well. The South Carolina Supreme Court had 
relied on North Carolina law to construe the South Carolina statute at 
issue.31 Bouie discarded this reliance, observing that “[i]t would be a rare 
situation in which the meaning of a statute of another State sufficed to 
afford a person ‘fair warning’ that his own State’s statute meant something 
quite different from what its words said.”32 It follows that had the South 
Carolina Supreme Court simply decided to apply North Carolina law, that 
 
government effectuating an uncompensated taking through retroactive legislation. 524 U.S. 498, 538 
(1998). However, as part of this analysis, the plurality embraced due process considerations. Id. at 537 
(using the Takings Clause to strike down application of a retroactive law but noting that “[o]ur analysis 
of legislation under the Takings and Due Process Clauses is correlated to some extent, and there is a 
question whether the Coal Act violates due process in light of the Act’s severely retroactive impact” 
(citation omitted)); see also id. at 533 (“Retroactive legislation . . . presents problems of unfairness that 
are more serious than those posed by prospective legislation, because it can deprive citizens of 
legitimate expectations and upset settled transactions.” (quoting Gen. Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 
181, 191 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted))). Justice Breyer, joined by three other Justices in 
dissent, and Justice Kennedy, concurring in the judgment, rejected the plurality’s reliance on the 
Takings Clause and instead would use solely the Due Process Clause to invalidate retroactive civil 
legislation. For Justice Breyer and the three dissenters, retroactive civil legislation violates due process 
where “an unfair retroactive assessment of liability upsets settled expectations, and it thereby 
undermines a basic objective of law itself.” Id. at 558 (Breyer, J., dissenting). However, Justice Breyer 
went on to decide that the retroactive legislation did not violate due process. Id. at 559. For Justice 
Kennedy, “due process requires an inquiry into whether in enacting the retroactive law the legislature 
acted in an arbitrary and irrational way.” Id. at 547 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy would 
have found that the retroactive legislation at issue did in fact violate due process. Id. at 549. 
28  See, e.g., Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 354 (1964). 
29  Id. (quoting HALL, supra note 1, at 61). 
30  Id. at 355. 
31  Id. at 359–60. 
32  Id. 
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too would have violated due process.33 Similarly, had North Carolina gained 
custody of the accused and applied North Carolina law, there would still be 
a due process problem, and for the same reason: the accused had no 
reasonable expectation that North Carolina law would ever apply to his 
conduct. As the sections below show, this is precisely the situation that 
arises when courts confuse prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction.34 The 
point here is that irrespective of forum, the choice of North Carolina law 
over entirely South Carolina conduct would violate due process. 
It so happens that courts have been dealing with these choice of law 
questions in the civil context forever. And it turns out that due process 
captures exactly this fair notice requirement concerning a law’s application 
in space. With respect to activity outside a state’s borders, the Supreme 
Court has held “that for a State’s substantive law to be selected in a 
constitutionally permissible manner, that State must have a significant 
contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such 
that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.”35 The 
“touchstone”36 of this due process test is protecting parties from “unfair 
surprise or frustration of legitimate expectations” resulting from the choice 
of a law they could not have expected would govern their conduct when 
they engaged in it.37 “When considering fairness in this context,” the Court 
has stressed, “an important element is the expectation of the parties.”38 
Thus, “[t]he application of an otherwise acceptable rule of law may result in 
unfairness to the litigants if, in engaging in the activity which is the subject 
of the litigation, they could not reasonably have anticipated that their 
actions would later be judged by this rule of law.”39 Needless to say, this 
sounds just like spatial legality. 
 
33  Cf. Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 464 (2001) (“Due process, of course, does not require a 
person to apprise himself of the common law of all 50 States in order to guarantee that his actions will 
not subject him to punishment in light of a developing trend in the law that has not yet made its way to 
his State.”). Rogers arguably may have weakened Bouie since it upheld the retroactive abolition of the 
so-called “year and a day rule”—which, “[a]t common law, . . . provided that no defendant could be 
convicted of murder unless his victim had died by the defendant’s act within a year and a day of the 
act.” Id. at 453. Rogers is not in tension with this Article’s thesis, however, since the defendant in that 
case certainly did not rely on existing law to structure his conduct when he stabbed his victim in the 
heart with a butcher knife. Id. at 454. 
34  See infra Part I.A–B. 
35  Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985) (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 
449 U.S. 302, 312–13 (1981)). 
36  Hague, 449 U.S. at 333 (Powell, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the plurality’s test but not the 
application of the test to the facts). 
37  Id. at 318 n.24 (plurality opinion). 
38  Shutts, 472 U.S. at 822. 
39  Hague, 449 U.S. at 327 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Shutts, 472 U.S. at 822 
(“There is no indication that when the leases involving land and royalty owners outside of Kansas were 
executed, the parties had any idea that Kansas law would control.”). 
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These doctrines of fair notice in time and space combine to make out a 
constitutionally grounded spatial legality concept under the Due Process 
Clause. And the interstate jurisprudence holds strong analogical and 
litigation value for the concept in relation to U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction 
in the international context. Although the interstate and international 
systems are by no means identical, both are comprised of legally coequal 
sovereigns; in this respect, the interstate cases supply a useful heuristic for 
thinking about U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction vis-à-vis other nations. 
Moreover, the cases carry real weight when it comes to measuring the 
exercise of that jurisdiction since U.S. courts uniformly have held that the 
Due Process Clause also governs federal extraterritoriality and have 
borrowed from the interstate context to gauge it.40 Hence the cases offer a 
helpful tool not only for thinking about U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction 
claims, but also for actually resolving them. And that is, after all, the 
subject of this Article: namely, whether aggressive jurisdiction over foreign 
conduct like drug running, supporting terrorism, and abusing human rights 
satisfies spatial legality. What follows explains why, on a spatial legality 
analysis operating through due process, some decisions in these areas are 
wrong and perhaps unconstitutional while others may cut off jurisdiction 
unnecessarily. 
The discussion also transitions spatial legality to controversial 
international law issues of jurisdiction recently debated in a series of 
opinions in the International Court of Justice.41 Like U.S. law, international 
law also contains legality principles—for example, that “[n]o one shall be 
held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which 
did not constitute a criminal offense, under national or international law, at 
the time when it was committed.”42 On its face, the principle ensures the 
existence in time of a substantive “national or international law” before 
conduct can be subject to that law. Spatial legality casts the principle across 
not only time but also space to take into account not only existing 
substantive law but also existing jurisdictional law. In this way, spatial 
legality seeks to ensure that conduct “constitute[d] a criminal offense, under 
national or international law” applicable not only “when it was committed,” 
but also where it was committed. 
 
40  See infra text accompanying notes 50–53. For a powerful explanation of why Fifth Amendment 
Due Process limits apply, see Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth 
Amendment Due Process, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1217 (1992). 
41  See infra text accompanying notes 93–117. 
42  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 15(1), adopted Dec. 19, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171; see also Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 
7(1), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (articulating a substantially identical principle). 
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A. Postconduct Presence 
Physical presence of the accused in the forum’s territory has been used 
in both U.S. and international law to justify applying forum law to the 
accused’s prior conduct outside the forum. Presence is fine to establish 
adjudicative jurisdiction, but it cannot alone justify the exercise of 
prescriptive jurisdiction. To begin with some recent headline-grabbing 
examples,43 a number of cases bubbling up in federal court charge foreign 
defendants under U.S. narco-terrorism laws for agreeing with undercover 
U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency agents to run drugs abroad.44 Some of the 
agreements charged appear to have no overt U.S. connection, like 
agreements to transport drugs across Africa into Europe.45 To meet statutory 
jurisdiction requirements, the government accordingly has relied in large 
part on the narco-terrorism statute’s provision creating jurisdiction where, 
“after the conduct required for the offense occurs an offender is brought 
into or found in the United States, even if the conduct required for the 
offense occurs outside the United States.”46 The government has 
increasingly relied on this type of provision to prosecute foreign defendants 
for activity abroad unconnected to the United States, including providing 
material support to terrorism and receiving military training from a foreign 
terrorist organization. And the courts have been receptive.47 For their part, 
defendants have tried to challenge the provision as exceeding jurisdictional 
limits of international law,48 a clear loser of an argument given that 
Congress can override international law by express statutory provision.49 
But if the only “jurisdictional hook,” so to speak, is that the offender is 
later brought into the United States, application of U.S. law to entirely 
foreign conduct prior to the U.S. presence could create spatial legality 
 
43  See Benjamin Weiser, For Prosecutor in New York, a Global Beat, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2011, at 
A1 (late edition). 
44  See, e.g., Complaint at 9, United States v. Issa, No. 09 Cr. 01244 (RJH) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 
2009). 
45  See, e.g., id. 
46  21 U.S.C. § 960a(b)(5) (2006); see, e.g., Government’s Memorandum of Law in Response to the 
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Indictment and for Pretrial Discovery at 16–17, Issa, No. 09 Cr. 
1244 (RJH) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2011). The other basis of jurisdiction relied upon by the government, 
that “the offense, the prohibited drug activity, or the terrorist offense occurs in or affects interstate or 
foreign commerce,” § 960a(b)(2), runs into other constitutional hurdles where the foreign commerce is 
not with the United States. See Anthony J. Colangelo, The Foreign Commerce Clause, 96 VA. L. REV. 
949, 1014–40 (2010). 
47  See, for example, United States v. Ahmed, No. 10 CR. 131 (PCK), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
123182 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2011), in which the government relied on a similar statutory basis of 
jurisdiction, id. at *5 (“[E]xtraterritorial jurisdiction may be exercised when the ‘offender is brought 
into . . . the United States . . . .’” (alteration in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339B(d)(1)(C); 
2339D(b)(3) (2006))), and the court rejected a defendant’s challenge to it, see id. at *8. 
48  See, e.g., Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Defendant Idriss Abdelrahman’s Pre-
Trial Motions at 2–6, Issa, No. 09 Cr. 1244 (RJH) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2011). 
49  See, e.g., United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 92 (2d Cir. 2003). 
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problems. Defendants have ways to make this type of challenge, too. As 
noted, courts have found that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause 
places some constraints on the extraterritorial application of U.S. law.50 The 
crucial question facing courts and litigants right now is: what are those 
limits? Different circuits have adopted different tests, but all seem to agree 
on the starting point that application of U.S. law cannot be “arbitrary or 
fundamentally unfair.”51 For one example, a leading test in the Second and 
Ninth Circuits52 holds that “[i]n order to apply extraterritorially a federal 
criminal statute to a defendant consistently with due process, there must be 
a sufficient nexus between the defendant and the United States, so that such 
application would not be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair.”53 
An important question thus becomes whether being “brought into or 
found in the United States”54 is enough. Here defendants run into the 
controversial but enduring maxim male captus bene detentus, which 
translates roughly as “a person improperly seized may nevertheless properly 
be detained (and brought to trial).”55 Or, to borrow the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s language, “the power of a court to try a person for crime is not 
impaired by the fact that he had been brought within the court’s jurisdiction 
by reason of ‘forcible abduction.’”56 In this respect, “due process of law is 
satisfied when one present in court is convicted of crime after having been 
fairly apprized of the charges against him and after a fair trial in accordance 
with constitutional procedural safeguards.”57 If it does not violate due 
process to forcibly abduct a defendant and bring him to stand trial in the 
 
50  See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1108–09 (9th Cir. 2006); Yousef, 327 F.3d at 
111–12; United States v. Perez-Oviedo, 281 F.3d 400, 402–03 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. Suerte, 
291 F.3d 366, 369–77 (5th Cir. 2002); United States v. Cardales, 168 F.3d 548, 552–53 (1st Cir. 1999). 
51  See Clark, 435 F.3d at 1108; Yousef, 327 F.3d at 111–12; Perez-Oviedo, 281 F.3d at 403; Suerte, 
291 F.3d at 377; Cardales, 168 F.3d at 553. 
52  The Supreme Court has yet to address the issue. 
53  Yousef, 327 F.3d at 111 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 
248–49 (9th Cir. 1990)). 
54  21 U.S.C. § 960a(b)(5) (2006). 
55  Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics, Values and Functions, 216 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 
305 n.** (1989); see Malvina Halberstam, Agora: International Kidnaping: In Defense of the Supreme 
Court Decision in Alvarez-Machain, 86 AM. J. INT’L. L. 736, 738 (1992) (“This rule has been applied by 
the courts of a number of states, including Canada, France, Germany, England and Israel. A treaty 
provision that would have prohibited the exercise of jurisdiction over a person illegally seized, proposed 
in 1935 by the Harvard Research in International Law, was never adopted. Nor has the rule been 
modified since then by the emergence of a new customary rule based on state practice. Although 
scholars are critical of the rule and have urged that it be reexamined and rejected, they acknowledge that 
it remains in effect.” (footnotes omitted)). 
56  United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 661 (1992) (quoting Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 
519, 522 (1952)). The issue of whether states (or state agents) as opposed to private individuals are 
allowed to engage in such forcible abductions under international law is beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
57  Id. at 662 (quoting Frisbie, 342 U.S. at 522). 
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United States, jurisdiction based on the accused being “brought into or 
found in the United States” would appear plainly constitutional. 
But that argument mixes up two different types of jurisdiction. Male 
captus bene detentus goes to the adjudicative jurisdiction of the court, not 
the jurisdiction to prescribe and apply rules of conduct. In fact, if one looks 
at the Supreme Court case anchoring the doctrine in U.S. law, the question 
of prescriptive jurisdiction was a nonissue because the defendant committed 
his offense in the forum’s territory and then fled to a foreign location. The 
doctrine famously traces its roots to a nineteenth-century case, Ker v. 
Illinois.58 The defendant in Ker committed larceny in Illinois and fled to 
Peru.59 He was later abducted in Peru and brought back to the United States 
to face trial (and, ultimately, conviction).60 He challenged the state court’s 
jurisdiction on due process grounds.61 The Supreme Court rejected his 
challenge, holding that “forcible abduction is no sufficient reason why the 
party should not answer when brought within the jurisdiction of the court 
which has the right to try him for such an offence.”62 What “the right to try 
him for such an offence” meant, however, connected directly back to the 
existence of prescriptive jurisdiction. Because Ker committed his acts in 
Illinois, Illinois had the right to prosecute him. Or as the Supreme Court put 
it, “[s]o here, when found within the jurisdiction of the State of Illinois and 
liable to answer for a crime against the laws of that State . . . it is not easy 
to see how he can say that he is there ‘without due process of law,’ within 
the meaning of the constitutional provision.”63 
Male captus bene detentus and Ker thus stand only for the proposition 
that bringing the defendant within the forum’s territory gives the forum 
adjudicative jurisdiction. Whether the forum has prescriptive jurisdiction to 
apply its law to the defendant’s conduct is an entirely separate question and, 
according to Ker itself, predicates the exercise of adjudicative jurisdiction.64 
In sum, while postconduct presence may be enough to authorize U.S. 
jurisdiction as a statutory matter, it remains to be seen whether it also can 
justify jurisdiction as a constitutional matter of applying U.S. law to the 
foreign conduct in the first place. 
 
58  119 U.S. 436 (1886). A later Supreme Court case, Frisbie v. Collins, extended the rule in Ker to 
abductions in other U.S. states. See 342 U.S. at 522 (holding that the forcible abduction of a defendant in 
Illinois by Michigan police officers to bring the defendant back to Michigan to stand trial did not violate 
due process). For this reason, the doctrine is often referred to as the “Ker–Frisbie doctrine.” See, e.g., 
United States v. Oscar-Torres, 507 F.3d 224, 228 (4th Cir. 2007). 
59  Ker, 119 U.S. at 437–38. 
60  Id. at 437–39. 
61  Id. at 439–40. 
62  Id. at 444. 
63  Id. at 440 (emphasis added) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1). 
64  See id. Generally, this principle will always be true in criminal cases, since one sovereign will not 
enforce the penal laws of another. See, e.g., The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 123 (1825) (“The 
courts of no country execute the penal laws of another . . . .”). 
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This brings the discussion back to the Fifth Amendment due process 
test requiring a U.S. nexus for the United States constitutionally to apply 
U.S. law to activity abroad. This test did not materialize out of nowhere. It 
basically replicates in the international context under the Fifth Amendment 
the governing test in the interstate context under the Fourteenth 
Amendment discussed above,65 which holds “that for a State’s substantive 
law to be selected in a constitutionally permissible manner, that State must 
have a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating 
state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor 
fundamentally unfair.”66 Again, the test is designed to protect parties from 
“unfair surprise or frustration of legitimate expectations” resulting from the 
choice of a law they could not have expected would govern their conduct 
when they engaged in it.67 
Supreme Court jurisprudence on choice of law is therefore instructive. 
And it analogically rejects postconduct presence in the United States as a 
valid ground for extending U.S. law to prior conduct outside the United 
States. In particular, the Court has viewed with hostility claims that a 
postoccurrence move to a forum authorizes application of the forum’s law 
to pre-move activities. In Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, for example, a 
Mexico domiciliary received an insurance policy in Mexico from a Mexican 
agency to cover a Mexican risk.68 He then tried to use his Texas residency 
after the loss to apply Texas law to the policy’s terms.69 The Court held that 
application of Texas law violated due process because “nothing in any way 
relating to the policy sued on . . . was ever done or required to be done in 
Texas. . . . Texas was, therefore, without power to affect the terms of 
contracts so made.”70 The Court flatly observed that Dick’s Texas residence 
was “without significance.”71 Similarly, in John Hancock Mutual Life 
Insurance Co. v. Yates, a Massachusetts insurer issued a life insurance 
policy to a New York resident in New York who died there soon after.72 His 
widow then moved to Georgia and sued on the policy, seeking application 
of Georgia law, which the Georgia courts applied.73 The Supreme Court 
found the application of Georgia law unconstitutional, explaining that 
“there was no occurrence, nothing done, to which the law of Georgia could 
 
65  See supra text accompanying notes 35–39. 
66  Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985) (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 
449 U.S. 302, 312–13 (1981)). 
67  Hague, 449 U.S. at 318 n.24 (plurality opinion); accord Shutts, 472 U.S. at 822 (“When 
considering fairness . . . an important element is the expectation of the parties.”). 
68  281 U.S. 397, 403–04 (1930). 
69  Id. at 402. 
70  Id. at 408. 
71  Id. 
72  299 U.S. 178, 179 (1936). 
73  See id. at 179, 181. 
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apply.”74 The Court has since read Dick and Yates to stand for the broad 
proposition “that a postoccurrence change of residence to the forum State 
[is] insufficient in and of itself to confer power on the forum State to choose 
its law.”75 Or, put even more strongly by some members of the Court, 
“postaccident residence . . . is constitutionally irrelevant to the choice-of-
law question,”76 and “[w]hen the expectations of the parties . . . are the 
central due process concern, . . . an unanticipated postaccident occurrence is 
clearly irrelevant for due process purposes.”77 
Despite the differing degrees in the language above, the rationale 
behind all of it is the same: “there was no occurrence, nothing done” in the 
forum at the time of the events giving rise to the suit “to which the law of 
[the forum] could apply.”78 The language comes from different opinions in 
the same case: Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague.79 In Hague, a Wisconsin 
resident was killed in a motorcycle accident in Wisconsin.80 His widow later 
moved to Minnesota and sued there on the deceased’s auto insurance 
policy, seeking application of Minnesota law.81 A plurality of the Court 
found that, although the postaccident move by itself could not justify 
application of Minnesota law, the widow’s Minnesota residence was not 
constitutionally irrelevant.82 By contrast, Justice Stevens in concurrence and 
three Justices in dissent found the postaccident move “constitutionally 
irrelevant.”83 The four Justices who considered the widow’s Minnesota 
residence relevant to whether Minnesota law constitutionally could apply to 
her claim certainly were not without reason, at least when the contact is 
viewed from the perspective of state interests: Minnesota naturally had 
some interest in applying Minnesota law to benefit its residents.84 But 
nobody thought that an interest arising out of a postoccurrence move alone 
could justify application of Minnesota law, especially considering the 
contact’s obvious deficiency from the perspective of reasonable 
 
74  Id. at 182. Although the Court relied primarily on the Full Faith and Credit Clause, see id. at 183, 
the analysis is the same under the Due Process Clause, and the two have since been combined, see 
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 & n.10 (1981) (plurality opinion). Indeed, one member of 
the Court has since observed that “John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. is probably best understood as a due 
process case.” Hague, 499 U.S. at 321, n.4 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 
75  Id. at 319 (plurality opinion). 
76  Id. at 337 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
77  Id. at 331 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 
78  Yates, 299 U.S. at 182; see also Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 408 (1930) (holding that 
Texas law constitutionally could not be applied to contracts for which nothing “was ever done or 
required to be done in Texas”). 
79  449 U.S. 302 (1981). 
80  Id. at 305 (plurality opinion). 
81  Id. 
82  See id. at 318–19. 
83  See id. at 337 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
84  See id. at 319 (plurality opinion). 
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expectations—a deficiency at least four other Justices felt disqualified it 
altogether from constitutional consideration.85 
The salient lesson in all of these cases is that, because due process 
protects parties’ reasonable expectations, a postoccurrence move to the 
forum cannot by itself constitutionally justify application of forum law to 
prior occurrences outside the forum. This reasoning extends seamlessly to 
federal extraterritoriality over foreigners “brought into or found in” the 
United States after their foreign conduct: a postconduct move to the United 
States cannot by itself constitutionally justify application of U.S. law to 
prior conduct outside the United States. 
The good lawyer may try to distinguish the Supreme Court’s choice of 
law jurisprudence from cases involving the application of U.S. law to 
conduct abroad by noting that it was the plaintiff in the Supreme Court 
cases, not the defendant, who subsequently moved to the forum. But that 
distinction is unpersuasive for a number of reasons. First, it is immaterial to 
the underlying rationale: in both situations “there was no occurrence, 
nothing done” in the forum at the time of the events giving rise to the suit 
“to which the law of [the forum] could apply.”86 It also cuts against Ker, a 
criminal case that squarely involved bringing the defendant back to a state 
to stand trial.87 There the Court expressly predicated the state’s exercise of 
adjudicative jurisdiction over the defendant, or its “right to try him,” on the 
fact that he was “liable to answer for a crime against the laws of that state”88 
because he committed the crime in the state’s territory and then fled.89 The 
distinction moreover would impose unrealistic, and consequently unfair, 
burdens on defendants.90 Having to gear one’s everyday conduct toward 
compliance with the laws of every place one someday might travel would 
be absurd. Finally, it would severely interfere with the jurisdiction, and 
hence the “sovereignty,” of other states, a point taken up in more detail 
below.91 In any event, even if one thought the distinction had any traction, it 
vanishes where foreign defendants are “brought into or found in” the United 
 
85  See supra notes 75–77 and accompanying text. Justice Stewart took no part in the consideration 
or decision of the case. Hague, 449 U.S. at 320. The plurality relied on other contacts to support the 
application of Minnesota law. I discuss these contacts infra Part I.B. 
86  John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178, 182 (1936); see also Home Ins. Co. v. 
Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 408 (1930). 
87  See Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 437–38 (1886). 
88  Id. at 440. 
89  Id. at 444. 
90  Indeed, this critique has been applied even where conduct does exhibit a connection to a state but 
the defendant may not be adequately aware of that connection, as in the passive personality basis for 
jurisdiction. Thus, “[t]he principle has not been generally accepted for ordinary torts or crimes, but it is 
increasingly accepted as applied to terrorist and other organized attacks on a state’s nationals by reason 
of their nationality, or to assassination of a state’s diplomatic representatives or other officials.” 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402 cmt. g (1987). 
91  See infra Part II. 
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States by forcible transfer via extradition or abduction.92 Like a plaintiff’s 
postoccurrence move, this postoccurrence contact with the forum is 
completely outside of the defendant’s control. 
The cases therefore support the proposition that a party’s 
postoccurrence presence in a forum may give the forum adjudicative 
jurisdiction over the party, but to use such presence to justify prescriptive 
jurisdiction over prior activity outside the forum creates potential spatial 
legality problems. Even though the forum’s law may have existed at the 
time of the conduct, the party’s contact—or “nexus”—with the forum 
occurs after the conduct; therefore, the party may not have reasonably 
expected forum law would apply at the time of conduct. 
This jurisdictional bootstrap, or blending of adjudicative and 
prescriptive jurisdiction, has seduced not only U.S. lawmakers and courts. 
In what has been called the International Court of Justice’s “most important 
case on international criminal law since the 1927 Lotus decision,”93 a 
number of judges appear to have endorsed the technique. The so-called 
Arrest Warrant case arose when Congo sued Belgium after a Belgian 
magistrate issued an arrest warrant for Congo’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi.94 The case sparked controversy for a couple 
of reasons. First, Belgium had no territorial or national link either to the 
accused or to his alleged crimes motivating the warrant. The only basis of 
jurisdiction was the principle of universal jurisdiction, implemented at the 
time in Belgium’s then-famous (and since-neutered) universal jurisdiction 
law.95 As the name suggests, universal jurisdiction purports to grant all 
states jurisdiction over certain especially harmful offenses against 
international law, irrespective of where the offense occurs or the 
nationalities of the perpetrators or victims. Adding to the fracas in the 
Arrest Warrant case was the fact that Yerodia was not present in Belgium 
when the warrant issued, provoking complaints of “universal jurisdiction in 
absentia.”96 It was likely this wrinkle that bred confusion regarding the 
exercise of adjudicative versus prescriptive jurisdiction in a series of 
separate opinions addressing universal jurisdiction, to which I will return 
momentarily. The second controversial—and ultimately determinative—
feature of the case was that, as noted, Yerodia was Congo’s Minister of 
Foreign Affairs when the warrant issued. The Court disposed of the case on 
 
92  See, e.g., United States v. Ahmed, No. 10 CR. 131 (PKC), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123182, at *5 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2011). 
93  David Luban, A Theory of Crimes Against Humanity, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 85, 92 (2004). 
94  Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, 9–10 (Feb. 14). 
95  Loi du 10 fevrier 1999 relative a la repression des violations graves du droit international 
humanitaire, Moniteur Belge, Mar. 23, 1999, at 9286 (Belg.), translated in 38 I.L.M. 918, 921–25 
(Stefaan Smis & Kim Van der Borght trans., 1999). 
96  See Alain Winants, The Yerodia Ruling of the International Court of Justice and the 1993/1999 
Belgian Law on Universal Jurisdiction, 16 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 491, 500 (2003). 
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this ground, finding that Yerodia’s office cloaked him with an immunity 
that rendered the warrant contrary to international law.97 
Although the case was formally disposed of on immunity grounds, a 
majority of the judges weighed in on the universal jurisdiction question in a 
fractured series of separate opinions.98 The most noteworthy are President 
Guillaume’s, which rejected Belgium’s ability to exercise jurisdiction, and 
the joint opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buergenthal, which 
took a more permissive view.99 Guillaume’s view was categorical: 
“Universal jurisdiction in absentia as applied in the present case is 
unknown to international law.”100 To arrive at this result, Guillaume began 
with international conventional law, or treaty law.101 His overall conclusion 
was in fact merely a more catholic restatement of his conclusion earlier in 
the opinion that “[u]niversal jurisdiction in absentia is unknown to 
international conventional law.”102 
But Guillaume’s conclusion on the treaty law is incomplete at best. At 
worst, it obscures the concept of universal jurisdiction by focusing on only 
mandatory adjudicative jurisdiction and ignoring prescriptive jurisdiction. 
Guillaume noted that an increasing number of treaties covering 
international crimes establish jurisdiction for states parties where the 
offender is later found in the state, even if the crime did not occur on the 
state’s territory or flag vessel or involve its nationals.103 He then explains, 
correctly, that a state party is obligated to extradite or prosecute an offender 
found within its territory. Accordingly, “[the state party] must have first 
conferred jurisdiction on its courts to try him if he is not extradited. Thus, 
universal punishment of the offences in question is assured, as the 
perpetrators are denied refuge in all States.”104 Under the treaty regime, 
then, the offender’s presence in a state party triggers that state’s obligation 
to exercise adjudicative jurisdiction or, to borrow Guillaume’s phrase, the 
“jurisdiction o[f] its courts to try him.”105 As a result, the offender has no 
 
97  Arrest Warrant, 2002 I.C.J. at 33. 
98  Id. at 44, ¶ 16 (separate opinion of President Guillaume); id. at 61, ¶ 9 (separate opinion of Judge 
Koroma); id. at 54–58 (declaration of Judge Ranjeva); id. at 92, ¶ 6 (separate opinion of Judge Rezek); 
id. at 51, ¶ 12 (dissenting opinion of Judge Oda); id. at 83, ¶ 65 (joint separate opinion of Judges 
Higgins, Kooijmans & Buergenthal); id. at 125–27 (separate opinion of Judge ad hoc Bula Bula); id. at 
164–77 (dissenting opinion of Judge ad hoc Van den Wyngaert). 
99  Compare id. at 44 (separate opinion of President Guillaume), with id. at 83, ¶ 65 (joint separate 
opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans & Buergenthal). The two ad hoc judges were from countries 
opposing each other in the dispute. See id. at 100 (separate opinion of Judge ad hoc Bula Bula); id. at 
137 (dissenting opinion of Judge ad hoc Van den Wyngaert). 
100  Id. at 42, ¶ 12 (separate opinion of President Guillaume). 
101  Id. at 37–40. 
102  Id. at 40, ¶ 9; see id. at 44, ¶ 16. 
103  Id. at 37–40. 
104  Id. at 39, ¶ 9. 
105  Id. 
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safe haven within the combined territories of states parties to the treaty. 
This is surely right as far as it goes; but Guillaume’s opinion goes further. 
From the obligation to exercise adjudicative jurisdiction when the offender 
is present, he then extrapolates by a sort of hyper expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius construction a prohibition on jurisdiction when the 
offender is not present.106 In other words, he uses an obligation in one 
context to preclude an option in the other. 
Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buergenthal rejected this strong 
expressio unius argument and took a more sympathetic view of Belgium’s 
jurisdictional claim—though their joint opinion too has a lopsided focus on 
adjudicative jurisdiction. Like Guillaume’s opinion, the joint opinion 
spotlights the treaty provisions obliging states parties to exercise 
jurisdiction over offenders found in their territories.107 But unlike 
Guillaume, the joint opinion recognizes that “in these treaties is a principle 
of obligation, while the question in this case is whether Belgium had the 
right to issue and circulate the arrest warrant if it so chose.”108 Here the joint 
opinion understood that just because the treaties do not require states to 
exercise jurisdiction when the offender is not present in their territories, that 
does not mean states are prohibited from exercising jurisdiction in that 
circumstance. In line with this view, the joint opinion found that state 
practice “does not necessarily indicate . . . that such an exercise would be 
unlawful” and that it was “neutral as to [the] exercise of universal 
jurisdiction.”109 This has to be right, at least insofar as the treaties are 
concerned. Imagine that to demonstrate a norm of universal jurisdiction 
absent the offender’s presence in a state, treaties needed to obligate state 
parties to exercise jurisdiction in that situation: for the vast majority of the 
relevant treaties, the result would be something like 190 states 
simultaneously claiming jurisdiction. 
Yet despite its permissive view, the joint opinion was skeptical of 
universal jurisdiction. And its skepticism stemmed directly from a fixation 
on the offender’s presence in a state as a jurisdictional trigger. To be sure, 
the joint opinion viewed the treaty provisions obliging states parties to 
exercise jurisdiction when offenders are present as not really evidence of 
“universal jurisdiction, properly so called,” at all.110 Rather, “[b]y the loose 
use of language the [jurisdiction required by the provisions] has come to be 
referred to as ‘universal jurisdiction[,’] though this is really an obligatory 
territorial jurisdiction over persons, albeit in relation to acts committed 
elsewhere.”111 Put another way, the joint opinion viewed the treaty 
 
106  See id. at 39–40. 
107  See id. at 71–75 (joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans & Buergenthal). 
108  Id. at 75, ¶ 44. 
109  Id. at 76, ¶ 45. 
110  Id. 
111  Id. at 75, ¶ 41. 
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provisions as merely obliging states parties to exercise territorial 
jurisdiction over offenders present in their territories. Thus, although 
Guillaume’s opinion and the joint opinion disagree on what is needed to 
show the permissibility of universal jurisdiction under international law, 
underlying both opinions is the very intuitive and very pragmatic rationale 
that the presence of an offender in a state’s territory strengthens that state’s 
jurisdiction over her. 
And indeed, I want to argue that that is exactly what presence does in 
this context: it strengthens the state’s jurisdiction over the offender, not over 
her conduct outside the state. That is, presence goes to personal jurisdiction 
over the accused, which is a form of adjudicative, not prescriptive, 
jurisdiction. Taking this argument one step further—and this is where 
spatial legality rushes in—the exercise of personal jurisdiction necessarily 
must depend upon the existence of prescriptive jurisdiction in criminal 
cases since states will only apply their own criminal laws.112 If the state had 
no authority to apply its law to the offender’s conduct in the first place, it 
cannot now claim jurisdiction to do so just because the state gained custody 
of her. As in Ker, the state’s right to try the defendant depends upon its 
ability to apply law to her conduct in the first instance. Only here, the 
conduct in question had no connection to the state when it occurred. Roger 
O’Keefe has made this point powerfully in the context of the Arrest 
Warrant case: 
‘Universal jurisdiction’ . . . is shorthand for universal jurisdiction to prescribe, 
and refers to the assertion of jurisdiction to prescribe in circumstances where 
no other lawful head of prescriptive jurisdiction is applicable to the impugned 
conduct at the time of its commission. [And t]he term applies irrespective of 
whether this prescriptive jurisdiction is exercised in personam or in absentia: 
just as prescription and enforcement are logically and legally distinct, so too 
are they terminologically independent of each other.113 
O’Keefe observes, “[i]f this were not the case, then the prescription of the 
prohibition in question—in other words, the proscription of the relevant 
conduct—would take place after the commission of the prohibited conduct 
and, as such, would amount to ex post facto criminalization.”114 
 
112  See The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 123 (1825) (“The Courts of no country execute the 
penal laws of another . . . .”). 
113  Roger O’Keefe, Universal Jurisdiction: Clarifying the Basic Concept, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 
735, 754–55 (2004). 
114  Id. at 742. Moreover, if a state purports to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction over an offense that 
is not an offense under international law, there could be legality problems, especially if the actor enjoys 
immunity. As Brad Roth explains: 
[I]t is possible for the nullum crimen defence to arise directly from immunity ratione materiae: 
where, in the name of redressing an international law violation that has not been established as an 
international crime, a domestic prosecution proceeds from extraterritorial penal legislation that 
somehow falls within the state’s internationally recognized jurisdiction to prescribe, immunity 
ratione materiae blocks the prosecuting state’s jurisdiction to prescribe within the scope of the 
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This way of viewing the prescriptive‒adjudicative jurisdictional 
dynamic thus leads to one of two results: either (1) all of the treaty 
provisions requiring states parties to exercise jurisdiction when offenders 
are later found in their territories risk legality problems because the states 
obliged to exercise jurisdiction may have lacked the initial authority to 
apply law to the offense when it occurred or (2) the provisions simply 
require states parties to exercise personal adjudicative jurisdiction over 
offenders present in their territories in order to enforce a law that already 
applied to the offense by virtue of the treaty when the offense occurred. I 
submit that the latter view not only avoids spatial legality problems but also 
makes perfect sense under the treaties.115 After all, their basic purpose is to 
prescribe an international law against the offense in the combined territories 
of the states parties and to ensure prosecution.116 All the jurisdictional 
provisions do is obligate a state party to enforce that law when the offender 
is present in its territory because it now has personal jurisdiction over him. 
The consequence, as Guillaume noted, is that “universal punishment of the 
offences in question is assured, as the perpetrators are denied refuge in all 
States.”117 
This also suggests that the universal jurisdiction opinions drew 
awkward, or in Guillaume’s case, backward, implications from the treaty 
provisions. Instead of precluding (Guillaume’s view) or being orthogonal to 
(the Higgins, Kooijmans, and Buergenthal view) universal jurisdiction, the 
 
foreign-state agent’s official capacity, thereby leaving no penal law that condemns the agent’s 
conduct. 
Brad R. Roth, Just Short of Torture: Abusive Treatment and the Limits of International Criminal Justice, 
6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 215, 223 (2008). 
115  See Roger O’Keefe, The Grave Breaches Regime and Universal Jurisdiction, 7 J. INT’L CRIM. 
JUST. 811, 817 (2009) (reviewing history of prosecute-or-extradite provisions and observing that “there 
is no point in bringing suspects before the courts unless those courts enjoy competence over the 
impugned conduct. In short, the . . . provisions mandate both the endowment of the courts with universal 
jurisdiction over grave breaches and, should the opportunity arise and the usual prosecutorial criteria be 
satisfied, the exercise of this jurisdiction by means of prosecution”). 
116  See id. 
117  Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3, 39, ¶ 9 (separate 
opinion of President Guillaume). The jurisdictional provisions support this view. They set out first the 
principal bases that require states parties to exercise jurisdiction, for example commanding that “[e]ach 
Contracting State shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the 
offence” where, inter alia, it takes place on the state’s territory or involves its flag aircraft or nationals. 
E.g., Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft art. 4(1), Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 
1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105. Then, in separate, subsequent paragraphs, the treaties direct that “[e]ach 
Contracting State shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over 
the offence in the case where the alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite 
him . . . to any of the States mentioned” in the preceding paragraph. Id. art. 4(2). The international law 
generated by the treaty prohibits the offense, the states in the first paragraph are required to apply that 
prohibition based on their links to the offense when it occurred, and the state in the subsequent 
paragraph (in whose territory the offender is present) is required to apply it based on its current links to 
the offender. 
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treaty provisions strongly support it, at least as a matter of prescriptive 
jurisdiction. Only if the offense already was prohibited under a universal 
prohibition capable of application by all states parties—that a state 
subsequently must enforce if it obtains personal jurisdiction of an 
offender—does the exercise of jurisdiction stand. On this reading, the treaty 
provisions already postulate prescriptive jurisdiction over the offense, 
which is then enforced through the mandatory exercise of personal 
jurisdiction wherever the offender ends up within the combined territories 
of the states parties. Part III will return to universal jurisdiction as a solution 
to spatial legality problems in some situations. The objective here is to 
show how these problems have been stimulated through a blurring of the 
forum’s personal jurisdiction over the offender with its jurisdiction to 
regulate his extraterritorial activity. 
B. General Jurisdiction 
Another maneuver courts have used to justify applying forum law to 
activity outside the forum is to rely on what is called “general” personal 
jurisdiction over the defendant in civil cases. As any U.S. law student will 
recognize—and as the Supreme Court recently confirmed in Goodyear 
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown—personal jurisdiction can be 
either “specific” or “general.”118 “Adjudicatory authority is ‘specific’ when 
the suit ‘aris[es] out of or relate[s] to the defendant’s contacts with the 
forum.’”119 That is, it “depends on an ‘affiliatio[n] between the forum and 
the underlying controversy,’ principally, activity or an occurrence that takes 
place in the forum State and is therefore subject to the State’s regulation.”120 
We can put specific jurisdiction aside fairly quickly for present purposes 
because if the activity or occurrence takes place in the forum state and is 
therefore subject to the forum state’s regulation, there is no prescriptive 
jurisdiction problem and, consequently, no spatial legality problem. 
General jurisdiction, on the other hand, authorizes the forum state “to 
hear any and all claims against [defendants] when their affiliations with the 
State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at 
home in the forum State.”121 With general jurisdiction, the activities 
connecting the defendant to the forum are “so substantial and of such a 
nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings 
entirely distinct from those activities.”122 According to the Supreme Court, 
“[f]or an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general 
 
118  131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011). 
119  Id. at 2853 (alteration in original) (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall, 
466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984)). 
120  Id. at 2851 (alteration in original) (quoting Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, 
Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136 (1966)). 
121  Id. 
122  Id. at 2853 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945)). 
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jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile; for a corporation, it is an 
equivalent place, one in which the corporation is fairly regarded as at 
home.”123 Thus, individuals can always be sued in the forum where they 
live, and corporations can always be sued in the forum where, for example, 
their principal places of business or corporate headquarters are located. 
The doctrine is not, however, limited to these “paradigm” forums; it 
extends to any forum where a defendant’s contacts are substantially 
continuous and systematic.124 Hence, “[a] court may assert general 
jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country) corporations to 
hear any and all claims against them when their affiliations with the State 
are [substantially] ‘continuous and systematic.’”125 Moreover, general 
jurisdiction exists where defendants are served process while temporarily 
physically present in the territory of the forum state, even if the forum is not 
the defendant’s home state.126 This latter type of jurisdiction, often referred 
to as “tag” jurisdiction, is somewhat analogous to male captus bene 
detentus in the criminal law in that the party’s physical presence in the 
sovereign’s territory confers jurisdiction on its courts. Though, unlike in 
criminal cases, courts have found that fraudulently (and, by extension, one 
might say forcibly) obtaining the defendant’s presence does not qualify to 
establish personal jurisdiction in civil suits.127 
Because general jurisdiction contemplates “suit[s] against [defendants] 
on causes of action . . . entirely distinct”128 from their contacts with the 
forum, the possibility arises of being haled into a forum’s courts for conduct 
unrelated to that forum. Put another way, if I can always be sued in a forum 
with general jurisdiction over me, I can be sued there even for claims 
involving activities outside the forum. The question then becomes: does 
general jurisdiction of the forum’s courts to entertain suits against me, even 
for activity unrelated to the forum, necessarily mean that the forum also has 
general jurisdiction to apply forum law to me, even for activity unrelated to 
the forum? Some courts have said yes;129 the correct answer is no. 
 
123  Id. at 2853–54. 
124  Id. at 2851. 
125  Id. (emphasis added); see also Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 
408, 414 (1984) (“Even when the cause of action does not arise out of or relate to the foreign 
corporation’s activities in the forum State, due process is not offended by a State’s subjecting the 
corporation to its in personam jurisdiction when there are sufficient contacts between the State and the 
foreign corporation.” (footnote omitted)). 
126  Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 610–11 (1990) (“Among the most firmly established 
principles of personal jurisdiction in American tradition is that the courts of a State have jurisdiction 
over nonresidents who are physically present in the State.”). 
127  See, e.g., Wyman v. Newhouse, 93 F.2d 313, 314–15 (2d Cir. 1937). 
128  Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853 (2011) (quoting 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945)). 
129  See, e.g., Goldberg v. UBS AG, 690 F. Supp. 2d 92, 106–07 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). 
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Much like in the criminal cases in the previous section, the courts that 
have said “yes” have confused the jurisdiction of the forum’s courts over 
the defendant with the jurisdiction of the forum to prescribe law over the 
defendant’s activity outside the forum. The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly and 
unhelpfully blended these two types of jurisdiction in framing the Fifth 
Amendment nexus requirement, for example stating at the outset of its 
analysis that “[t]he nexus requirement serves the same purpose as the 
‘minimum contacts’ test in personal jurisdiction. It ensures that a United 
States court will assert jurisdiction only over a defendant who ‘should 
reasonably anticipate being haled into court’ in this country.”130 The 
internally quoted language comes from World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 
Woodson,131 a famous personal jurisdiction case. And as the language 
affirms, it concerns only whether a defendant “should reasonably anticipate 
being haled into court” in the forum, not whether the forum’s law applies. 
Nonetheless, lower courts have latched onto this description132 and have 
relied on personal jurisdiction over a defendant to bootstrap forum law to 
the defendant’s activity outside the forum. 
In Goldberg v. UBS AG, for instance, the Eastern District of New York 
extended this analysis specifically to multinational corporations, finding 
that because UBS, a global financial institution, was subject to general 
jurisdiction in New York, U.S. law constitutionally could apply to claims 
against it for materially supporting terrorism in the Middle East.133 
According to the court, “there is nothing fundamentally unfair about 
requiring UBS, a large and sophisticated company which maintains a full-
time active presence in the United States, to comply with United States 
law.”134 The court repeated this rationale on UBS’s motion for an 
interlocutory appeal, quoting a series of personal jurisdiction decisions, 
including the language above from World-Wide Volkswagen.135 To be sure, 
the court noted that because UBS is “a corporation that engages in 
systematic and continuous activities within the State of New York,” 
 
130  United States v. Klimavicius-Viloria, 144 F.3d 1249, 1257 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)); see also United States v. Perlaza, 439 F.3d 
1149, 1168 (9th Cir. 2006) (“The nexus requirement is a judicial gloss applied to ensure that a defendant 
is not improperly haled before a court for trial. . . . [It] serves the same purpose as the ‘minimum 
contacts’ test in personal jurisdiction.” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Moreno-Morillo, 
334 F.3d 819, 829 n.8 (9th Cir. 2003))). 
131  444 U.S. 286. 
132  Id. at 297 (emphasis added); see infra notes 133–37 and accompanying text; see also United 
States v. Bout, No. 08 Cr. 365 (SAS), slip op. at 8, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74318, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. July 
11, 2011) (asserting that extraterritorial application of U.S. law satisfies due process where defendant 
“should reasonably anticipate being haled into court in this country”); United States v. al Kassar, 582 F. 
Supp. 2d 488, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (same). 
133  660 F. Supp. 2d 410, 431 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). 
134  Id. 
135  Goldberg v. UBS AG, 690 F. Supp. 2d 92, 106–07 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). 
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precedent backed the application of U.S. law.136 The precedent cited by the 
court on “systematic and continuous” contacts, however, related to general 
jurisdiction in the forum’s courts, not choice of the forum’s law.137 A strong 
corporate presence in a forum certainly could be enough to subject the 
corporation to personal jurisdiction there, but whether the forum 
constitutionally can apply its law to the corporation’s conduct unrelated to 
the forum is a different question.138 
To begin to answer it, Supreme Court cases from the interstate context 
are again instructive. And here the Court has been crystal clear that the 
constitutional inquiries governing personal jurisdiction and choice of law 
are distinct. Hague put it succinctly: “[E]xamination of a State’s contacts 
may result in divergent conclusions for jurisdiction and choice-of-law 
purposes.”139 And just last term in a case involving the exercise of 
jurisdiction internationally, the Court observed that “[a] sovereign’s 
legislative authority to regulate conduct may present considerations 
different from those presented by its authority to subject a defendant to 
judgment in its courts.”140 This is all to say that general jurisdiction in the 
forum’s courts does not mean the forum necessarily can apply forum law. 
In Yates, for example, the defendant insurance company did enough 
business in Georgia unrelated to the suit to subject it to personal jurisdiction 
there.141 If general jurisdiction of the forum’s courts were enough to trigger 
general application of the forum’s laws,142 Georgia law constitutionally 
could have applied to the insurance policy at issue and that would have 
 
136  Id. at 107. 
137  See id. (citing Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 448 (1952), for the 
proposition that “personal jurisdiction [can be] present even where [the] cause of action is unrelated to 
the defendant’s activities in the forum state provided that the activities are sufficiently continuous and 
substantial to make the assertion of jurisdiction reasonable”). 
138  A different situation presents itself where a party’s activity in a state where it is subject to 
general jurisdiction is linked to the charged offense or harm, some portion of which takes place outside 
the forum, thereby creating a relationship or jurisdictional nexus between the activity and the forum. 
See, e.g., United States v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2011) (upholding the conviction of a U.S. 
charity for materially supporting terrorism abroad by funding Hamas); Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 
654 F.3d 11, 26 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“The complaints at issue concern aiding and abetting liability 
where at least some of the conduct causing harm to the plaintiffs in Indonesia occurred in the United 
States. The district court . . . found that the plaintiffs had presented sufficient evidence of corporate 
control within the United States to go to trial.”); see also id. at 70 (describing plaintiffs’ argument “that 
Exxon Mobil knew about and participated, indeed directed, from the United States the allegedly 
culpable conduct to the detriment of plaintiffs”). Going forward, and particularly if the present thesis 
gains traction, establishing this type of relationship will comprise an important legal and factual element 
in cases involving transnational allegations. 
139  Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 317 n.23 (1981) (plurality opinion). 
140  J. McIntyre Mach. Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2790 (2011). 
141  See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178, 179 (1936). 
142  See Hague, 449 U.S. at 338 n.4 (Powell, J., dissenting) (“This Court did not hint in Yates that 
this fact was of the slightest significance to the choice-of-law question, although it would have been 
crucial for the exercise of in personam jurisdiction.”). 
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been the end of it. But as we know, the Court held the application of 
Georgia law unconstitutional.143 More recently, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. 
Shutts144 erased all doubt on this point. The Supreme Court found personal 
jurisdiction in Kansas state courts constitutional but invalidated the state 
courts’ application of Kansas substantive law to the entirety of class action 
claims from the fifty U.S. states and several foreign nations seeking interest 
on suspended royalty payments for natural gas leases.145 The Court couched 
its choice of law holding strongly in terms of notice: “When considering 
fairness in this context,” the Court explained, “an important element is the 
expectation of the parties.”146 And because “[t]here is no indication that 
when the leases involving land and royalty owners outside of Kansas were 
executed, the parties had any idea that Kansas law would control,” 
application of Kansas law was unconstitutional.147 
In fairness to the district court in Goldberg, the Hague plurality 
muddied the waters in this area by finding personal jurisdiction relevant to 
the choice of law inquiry,148 and Goldberg reasonably cited it for this 
proposition.149 Yet, as with the postoccurrence move, the Hague plurality’s 
consideration of this contact was highly context specific and is best read as 
limited to the particular facts and issues of that case—namely, auto 
insurance coverage for motorists traveling to neighboring states where the 
insurance company knew the insured would travel.150 Read in context, the 
plurality immediately qualified its use of personal jurisdiction to weight the 
constitutional choice of law scale, hedging that “[t]here is no element of 
unfair surprise or frustration of legitimate expectations as a result of 
Minnesota’s choice of its law” because Allstate “was undoubtedly aware 
that Mr. Hague was a Minnesota employee, [and therefore] it had to have 
anticipated that Minnesota law might apply to an accident in which Mr. 
Hague was involved.”151 The plurality then found that, in fact, “Allstate 
specifically anticipated that Mr. Hague might suffer an accident” in 
Minnesota in light of the policy coverage.152 
By the plurality’s own terms then, its use of general jurisdiction to 
attach forum law depended on other factors, specifically Allstate’s 
knowledge at the time the policy was entered into of the deceased’s extant 
 
143  See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
144  472 U.S. 797 (1985). 
145  Id. at 799. 
146  Id. at 822. 
147  Id. The Court later held that application of Kansas’s statute of limitations to out-of-state claims 
was constitutional because, as informed by principles of international law, such a rule is procedural as 
opposed to substantive. Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 722–23, 726 (1988). 
148  Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 317–18 (1981) (plurality opinion). 
149  Goldberg v. UBS AG, 690 F. Supp. 2d 92, 107 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). 
150  Hague, 449 U.S. at 318 & n.24. 
151  Id. at 318 n.24. 
152  Id. 
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contacts with the forum, and even more specifically, that he traveled to 
work there on a daily basis, leading to the probability of forum law being 
applied to his automobile insurance claim. Hence the dissent’s curt retort to 
the plurality’s use of personal jurisdiction as a choice of law hook: “But this 
argument proves too much. The insurer here does business in all 50 States. 
The forum State has no interest in regulating that conduct of the insurer 
unrelated to property, persons, or contracts executed within the forum 
State.”153 The dissent then called out the plurality’s effort to avoid this result 
more broadly by focusing on other factors connecting the deceased to the 
forum: “The plurality recognizes this flaw and attempts to bolster the 
significance of the local presence of the insurer by combining it with other 
factors deemed significant . . . [like] the fact that the deceased worked in the 
forum State. This merely restates the basic question in the case.”154 
To sum up, the Supreme Court cases—including the most recent 
cases—are clear that different tests govern personal jurisdiction and choice 
of law and indicate that general personal jurisdiction over a defendant does 
not automatically authorize the application of forum law to that defendant’s 
extraterritorial activities under the Constitution. Moreover, even where a 
plurality of the Court did consider general jurisdiction relevant, it instantly 
diluted that contact by qualifying it with other factors unique to the case 
before it. Yet general personal jurisdiction ordinarily does suggest a strong 
connection between a party and the forum, one that in certain circumstances 
perhaps can provide notice that forum law may apply to the party’s conduct 
outside the forum. The more nuanced and precise constitutional question 
thus becomes when general jurisdiction in the forum coincides with 
contacts sufficient to authorize application of forum law to the defendant’s 
out-of-state activity. Here there are a few scenarios that are very much open 
for debate after the Court’s recent personal jurisdiction decisions.155 
On one end of the spectrum, general jurisdiction may coincide with a 
party’s nationality or citizenship, which may justify general application of 
forum law to the party’s activities everywhere. This coincidence often will 
be captured by Goodyear’s reference to “paradigm” forums for general 
jurisdiction.156 Thus, in many cases, a party’s domicile or a corporation’s 
principal place of business will coincide with the nationality of that person 
or entity; these ties to the forum establish notice not only that the party may 
 
153  Id. at 338 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
154  Id. The court in Goldberg also tried to buttress its exercise of general jurisdiction with other 
contacts. I have explained elsewhere why the court got the law wrong as to those contacts. See Anthony 
J. Colangelo, A Unified Approach to Extraterritoriality, 97 VA. L. REV. 1019, 1104–05 (2011). 
155  See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011); McIntyre 
Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
156  Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853–54. 
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always be subject to suit in the forum, but also that forum law may always 
apply to the party’s activities.157 
On the other end of the spectrum, temporary physical presence in the 
forum can provide the personal jurisdiction hook.158 As noted, this is 
roughly equivalent to personal jurisdiction in criminal law (with the caveat 
that in civil suits, presence likely cannot be obtained by fraud or force).159 
But if the activity giving rise to the suit had no connection to the forum 
when it occurred, general jurisdiction in the forum’s courts based on the 
party’s subsequent presence cannot justify application of forum law for the 
reasons discussed in the previous section: postconduct presence is, to use 
the Supreme Court’s words, “insufficient in and of itself to confer power on 
the forum State to choose its law.”160 This distinction promises to be 
important going forward as foreign plaintiffs increasingly bring suit for 
harms abroad under state tort law against foreign defendants who moved to 
the United States after the conduct alleged in the suit.161 Although the 
defendants’ U.S. presence establishes personal jurisdiction now, it cannot 
justify the retroactive projection of state law to the defendants’ past foreign 
conduct. 
In between these two scenarios are situations in which foreign persons 
or entities have substantial, continuous, and systematic contacts with the 
forum that establish general jurisdiction.162 Unlike the temporary physical 
presence scenario, which is more likely to affect human beings, this 
scenario is more likely to affect corporations that do significant business in 
multiple jurisdictions.163 Because the jurisdictional calculus can depend in 
part on the underlying substantive law of corporations, the problem 
becomes somewhat more complex. For example, a key question likely to 
take on even more prominence after plaintiffs belatedly raised it in 
Goodyear is when courts can assert personal jurisdiction over foreign 
 
157  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402(2) 
& cmt. e (1987); Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1277, 1298–99 
(1989). 
158  See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
159  See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
160  Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 319 (1981) (plurality opinion). 
161  See, for example, the plaintiffs’ amended, consolidated complaint published as an appendix to 
the Eleventh Circuit opinion in Mamani v. Berzain, 654 F.3d 1148, 1168–71 (11th Cir. 2011) (alleging 
wrongful death, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, 
and negligence in the fourth through seventh claims for relief under Florida law for activity in Bolivia 
by Bolivians against Bolivians where defendants later moved to the United States). 
162  See, e.g., Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011) (“A 
court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country) corporations to hear 
any and all claims against them when their affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ 
as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.”). 
163  Accord id. 
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subsidiaries of U.S. corporations.164 In this respect, plaintiffs can try to 
“pierce the veil” between the entities or use agency theories to show the 
U.S. parent controlled the foreign subsidiary’s conduct.165 Presumably, if 
the veil is pierced or it is shown that the U.S. parent controlled the foreign 
subsidiary’s conduct, U.S. law may apply since there is a jurisdictional 
nexus between either the corporation (through the veil-piercing) or its 
conduct (through the agency relationship) and the United States. 
These complexities aside, however, the question remains whether 
general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation that does substantial, 
continuous, and systematic business in the United States means that U.S. 
law can apply to all of that foreign corporation’s activities everywhere, even 
activities having no connection to the United States. This was essentially 
the situation in Goldberg, where the court found that UBS’s entirely foreign 
conduct could be subject to U.S. law because UBS is “a corporation that 
engages in systematic and continuous activities within the State of New 
York.”166 At the very least, we now know the court’s use of personal 
jurisdiction precedent to reach this conclusion mixed up prescriptive and 
adjudicative jurisdiction tests under the Constitution. The real question 
from the foreign corporation’s and the Constitution’s point of view is: do 
substantial, continuous, and systematic contacts with the United States also 
mean that all of the corporation’s activities around the world are now 
subject to U.S. laws? 
It is a tough question, which I will try to divide and conquer. To begin 
with, a lot depends on what type of notice we are talking about. If it is 
notice of the law per se—that is, of what U.S. law provides—doing 
substantial business in the United States would seem plainly to suffice: 
because UBS does business in the United States, it knows U.S. law. But if 
the relevant notice is not simply what the law provides, but also that the law 
applies to activity unconnected with the forum, the question gets harder. For 
example, I know that some European countries have hate speech laws, but I 
do not expect those laws to apply to my conversations in the United States 
with other U.S. citizens. And this is true even if I have vacation homes in 
those European countries. Maybe my intuition is wrong, or maybe 
 
164  See id. at 2857 (“Respondents belatedly assert a ‘single enterprise’ theory, asking us to 
consolidate petitioners’ ties to North Carolina with those of Goodyear USA and other Goodyear entities. 
In effect, respondents would have us pierce Goodyear corporate veils, at least for jurisdictional 
purposes.” (citation omitted)). 
165  See Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Liability for Extraterritorial Torts Under the Alien Tort Statute 
and Beyond: An Economic Analysis, 100 GEO. L.J. 2161, 2206–07 (2012); see also Doe I v. Exxon 
Mobil Corp., 573 F. Supp. 2d 16, 30–32 (D.D.C. 2008) (discussing and applying agency and veil-
piercing theories in this context). Sykes notes “[a] potential difficulty” with agency theories “is that the 
relationship between a parent and a subsidiary is highly endogenous. Corporate lawyers, aware of these 
factors [courts use to identify agency], will counsel their clients to avoid running afoul of them.” Sykes, 
supra, at 32. 
166  Goldberg v. UBS AG, 690 F. Supp. 2d 92, 106–07 (E.D.N.Y. 2010). 
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corporations are somehow different because, say, money is fungible so 
everything is connected to everything else at some level. But it is a question 
that courts should cleanly analyze under the appropriate constitutional 
criteria instead of mixing up the relevant tests for adjudicative and 
prescriptive jurisdiction. As a purely legal matter, straightening out the 
doctrine and insisting on better decisionmaking advances the law. 
Indeed, the interstate context again provides a useful analogical tool 
and indicates that this is a weighty legal question with serious implications. 
Specifically, interstate commerce doctrine suggests that mooring the 
forum’s ability to apply law extraterritorially in its general jurisdiction over 
defendants is bad policy. I say bad policy instead of bad law because, unlike 
due process, which governs both state and federal extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, interstate commerce doctrine does not govern federal 
extraterritoriality in the international system.167 But the doctrine does 
reveal—and seeks especially to avoid—the dangers inherent in allowing 
states to regulate activity inside other states based only on adjudicative 
jurisdiction over defendants. Namely, allowing such regulation effectively 
forces defendants to comply with the most stringent requirements of any 
state where they do business, even for activities having no relationship to 
that state.168 The result is a de facto imposition of the strictest law in the 
multistate system on all commercial activity of the defendant everywhere, 
severely hampering not only the policies of other states, but also interstate 
commerce. 
For these reasons, the Supreme Court has held that the Interstate 
Commerce Clause “precludes the application of a state statute to commerce 
that takes place wholly outside of the State’s borders, whether or not the 
commerce has effects within the State.”169 The Clause guards particularly 
“against inconsistent legislation arising from the projection of one state 
regulatory regime into the jurisdiction of another State”170 that could 
“subject[] activities to inconsistent regulations”171 and generate commercial 
“gridlock” within the system.172 Thus, the Court has sought to prevent states 
from stifling through extraterritorial regulation “[t]he reallocation of 
 
167  For the differences between the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Clauses, see Colangelo, supra 
note 46, at 949, comparing and contrasting Congress’s powers under the Foreign and Interstate 
Commerce Clauses. 
168  See, e.g., Healy v. The Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 339–40 (1989) (“[A brewer] must determine 
[beer] prices knowing that the lowest bottle, can, or case price in any State would become the maximum 
bottle, can, or case price the brewer would be permitted to charge throughout the region . . . .”). 
169  Id. at 336 (quoting Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642–43 (1982) (plurality opinion)). 
170  Id. at 337. 
171  CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 88 (1987). 
172  Healy, 491 U.S. at 340. 
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economic resources to their highest valued use, a process which can 
improve efficiency and competition.”173 
The U.S. government may not care about such inefficiencies when it 
regulates “Commerce with foreign Nations,”174 and it is hard to say that the 
Foreign Commerce Clause places legal constraints on Congress’s power to 
project U.S. law abroad under a dormant Foreign Commerce Clause 
rationale.175 On the other hand, it is reasonable to conclude that the U.S. 
government would wish to avoid frustrating foreign commerce with the 
United States through excessive extraterritoriality as a blurry byproduct of 
courts erroneously conflating two different types of jurisdiction. Subjecting 
to U.S. regulation all activities around the world of foreign corporations 
with a U.S. presence, including activities with no direct U.S. connection, is 
sure to disincentivize foreign corporate presence and investment in the 
United States. Alan Sykes made the point as follows: “Corporations subject 
to suit in the United States thus face potentially discriminatory liability 
standards, imposing the costs of litigation and any resulting judgments on 
them for alleged conduct that actual and potential competitors can 
undertake without fear of liability.”176 The other option (apart from pulling 
out of the U.S. market) would be for the foreign corporation to restructure 
so that only a spinoff or subsidiary does business in the United States, a 
strategy that presents a host of other potential inefficiencies.177 This is again 
only a policy point, but it is a fairly compelling one based on our own 
experience facilitating commerce in a multistate system. It also does not 
concern U.S. regulation that applies to foreign activity where the activity 
itself evinces a relationship to the United States;178 rather, the concern is a 
sloppy jurisdictional analysis that surreptitiously uses U.S. presence to 
capture foreign activities otherwise unrelated to the United States. The 
stakes are simply too high for courts to be messing up the law. 
That said, it is not inconceivable that courts might develop prescriptive 
jurisdiction theories on which substantial, continuous, and systematic 
contacts with a forum put foreign defendants on notice that forum law 
applies to their activities everywhere. Unlike Goldberg, which drew from 
personal jurisdiction precedent, the relevant precedent in this context would 
be choice of law jurisprudence. And here courts would need to confront the 
fact that the Supreme Court has been clear that personal jurisdiction and 
 
173  Edgar, 457 U.S. at 643. Moreover, as Allan Erbsen points out, while “not typically understood 
as creating ‘rights’ . . . [the Dormant Commerce Clause is] privately enforceable, further cementing a 
role for individual citizens in the maintenance of constitutional order.” Allan Erbsen, Horizontal 
Federalism, 93 MINN. L. REV. 493, 548–49 (2008) (footnote omitted). 
174  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
175  See Colangelo, supra note 46, at 1014–24. 
176  Sykes, supra note 165, at 22. 
177  See id. at 21–24. 
178  See supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text. 
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choice of law tests are constitutionally different and that personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant does not mean forum law necessarily can 
apply to its extraterritorial activity. Courts also would need to squarely 
consider the risk of defeating reasonable expectations and imposing burdens 
on defendants by forcing them to comply with the laws of every place they 
might be subject to suit, even for activity having no connection to the 
distant forums. To be sure, such a rule would be tantamount to coercing 
compliance with the strictest law in the system and authorizing that law to 
override the laws of every other state where the defendant acts, including 
states with far stronger links to the activity, like the state where the activity 
occurred. 
This last point transitions the discussion to the next Part, which 
addresses directly the interests of those other states, often described as 
“sovereignty.” It also presages issues of conflicting overlapping laws and 
other related rule of law considerations captured by the Due Process Clause 
and raised in Part III and the Conclusion. 
II. SOVEREIGNTY 
So far, the discussion has focused largely on individual rights—
specifically, the right to fair notice that a particular law applies to an 
individual’s conduct at the time the individual engages in it. And the 
discussion has shown that this right can operate not only in time but also in 
space, such that the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction may violate it. In 
temporal legality discussions, sovereignty is often cast in opposition to the 
fair notice right.179 That is, the right to fair notice either limits the sovereign 
power to enforce retroactive laws or the sovereign power to enforce 
retroactive laws limits the right to fair notice. In this respect, temporal 
legality imagines a kind of tradeoff between sovereignty and individual 
rights, such that enlarging one reduces the other. 
Sovereignty factors into a spatial legality discussion too, though in a 
somewhat different way. Especially in the international system, the 
frequently heard objection to extraterritorial jurisdiction is that it violates 
the “sovereignty” of other states.180 Thus if State A asserts jurisdiction inside 
State B, the worry is that such an assertion might infringe State B’s 
sovereignty. But what does this mean? There has been a wealth of 
commentary deconstructing—and documenting the deconstruction of—the 
 
179  See Kenneth S. Gallant, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate and Jurisdiction to Prescribe in International 
Criminal Courts, 48 VILL. L. REV. 763, 776 (2003). 
180  See, e.g., Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 251–52 (2d Cir. 
2009) (describing a foreign government’s argument that assertion of U.S. extraterritorial prescriptive 
jurisdiction over a corporation “infringed on its sovereignty”). 
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concept of sovereignty.181 Yet the term itself has remained remarkably 
sticky. The sovereignty concern in a spatial legality situation is not the same 
as in a temporal legality situation where an individual right purports to limit 
what the sovereign can do in its own domain. Rather, in a spatial legality 
situation, it is another state that impairs sovereignty by reaching in and 
exerting power inside the sovereign’s domain. And once this analytical 
move is made, it becomes clear that instead of being in tension with 
individual rights, sovereignty actually reinforces them on a spatial legality 
analysis. 
We can begin by giving “sovereignty” some analytical content in this 
context. Unless we know what sovereignty is, it is impossible to discern 
whether it has been infringed. The word itself does no independent work. 
Standing alone it reduces to a tautology; it cannot tell us on its own whether 
a given entity is a sovereign or what that status entails. Sovereignty is a 
label signifying the result of an allocation of power, not the reason for that 
allocation of power.182 Once sovereignty means something, we can figure 
out when and how one state’s exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction may 
interfere with the sovereignty of other states. The discussion will then tie 
this analysis to spatial legality by showing that violations of spatial legality 
generally imply violations of sovereignty. In this way, spatial legality unites 
individual rights and sovereignty in a reciprocally reinforcing relationship 
that protects both. 
In the international system, sovereignty essentially describes the 
aggregate bundle of powers or entitlements, recognized by international 
law, that states enjoy vis-à-vis one another, as well as the interface between 
the state and international law.183 Every state enjoys the power or 
entitlement to make, apply, and enforce its laws inside its borders. These 
entitlements tend to define the state in relation to other states and to 
international law. Yet these relations are constantly morphing. For example, 
a state’s entitlement to exercise power inside its own borders used to be far 
more absolute. Before World War II, how a state treated its inhabitants 
simply was not a subject of international law.184 But now, while 
international law recognizes and indeed guarantees a state’s extensive 
 
181  See, e.g., Jenik Radon, Sovereignty: A Political Emotion, Not a Concept, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 
195 (2004); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order, 40 STAN. J. 
INT’L L. 283 (2004). 
182  See Ronald J. Allen & John P. Ratnaswamy, Heath v. Alabama: A Case Study of Doctrine and 
Rationality in the Supreme Court, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 801, 818 (1985); see also Jeremy 
Waldron, The Rule of International Law, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 15, 21 (2006) (“What [a state’s] 
sovereignty is and what it amounts to is not given as a matter of the intrinsic value of its individuality, 
but determined by the rules of the international order.”). 
183  See Anthony D’Amato, Is International Law Really “Law”?, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1293, 1308 
(1985). 
184  Louis Henkin, Lecture, That “S” Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human Rights, Et 
Cetera, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1999). 
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powers within its borders, they are less absolute. The state cannot 
legitimately claim power to, say, perpetrate serious human rights abuses 
upon its inhabitants. International law has developed to curtail state power 
in this regard. Sovereignty itself offers no analytically independent reason 
why states have or do not have power; it simply describes the power states 
do have at any given moment of development of the international legal 
system. 
Yet one might argue that sovereignty at its purest describes absolute 
power, and therefore any outside interference with a state’s regulatory 
powers inside its borders is an erosion of sovereignty. The apparent stability 
of this definition is also a mirage, however, as illustrated by states’ powers 
vis-à-vis each other as coequal sovereigns in the international system. 
Entitlements to make, apply, and enforce law used to be strongly territorial 
in relation to other states, such that any exercise of jurisdiction in another 
state constituted an infringement of that state’s sovereignty. The absolute 
power argument underwriting these jurisdictional rules comes through 
acutely in Chief Justice John Marshall’s eloquent restatement of the law as 
it existed in 1812: 
 The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily 
exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself. 
Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would imply 
a diminution of its sovereignty . . . . 
 . . . .  
 . . . [Consequently] [t]his full and absolute territorial jurisdiction being alike 
the attribute of every sovereign . . . [is] incapable of conferring extra-territorial 
power . . . .185 
Here too, however, international law has changed. And, in turn, so have the 
meanings and incidents of sovereignty. As noted at the beginning of this 
Article,186 international law now authorizes states to exercise extraterritorial 
jurisdiction inside other states in a variety of situations, including over acts 
abroad that have, or are intended to have, effects within their territories,187 
acts by their nationals abroad,188 acts against their nationals abroad in some 
circumstances,189 and acts abroad that threaten the state’s existence and 
governmental functions.190 
 
185  The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136–37 (1812). 
186  See supra text accompanying notes 22–25. 
187  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402(1)(c) 
(1987). 
188  Id. § 402(2). 
189  Id. § 402(3) & cmt. g. 
190  Id. § 402(3) & cmt. f. I bracket universal jurisdiction for the moment because, in my view, it is 
not really an exercise of a state’s own prescriptive jurisdiction but is rather the enforcement by states of 
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Importantly, these modern bases are all about sovereignty. Just as the 
rigid territoriality of the nineteenth century was cast in terms of 
sovereignty, so too are these modern bases of extraterritorial jurisdiction 
cast in terms of sovereignty. That is, they all vindicate some ostensibly 
“sovereign” entitlement of the state—whether over territory (objective 
territoriality), persons (active and passive personality), or the state’s 
existence and official functions (protective principle). In an increasingly 
interconnected world with an ever-growing amount of transnational 
activity, states’ entitlements have expanded and now may overlap. Hence, 
while “sovereignty” previously was invoked to limit a state’s jurisdiction to 
its own territory, it now justifies jurisdiction outside a state’s territory and 
inside the territory of other states. In this context, the term is really just 
popular but protean shorthand for a state’s powers recognized by 
international law, and these powers tend to shift over time. 
Currently, these powers authorize the projection of a state’s law into 
other states where a recognized basis of jurisdiction exists touching upon 
the first state’s “sovereign” entitlements over its own territory, persons, or 
official state functions. Because international law gives all states power to 
exercise such jurisdiction, states are coequal sovereigns as a legal matter.191 
And just as rigid rules of territorial jurisdiction maintained coequal status in 
the nineteenth century, these rules of extraterritorial jurisdiction maintain 
coequal status today. It follows that if a state has a recognized basis to 
regulate extraterritorially under international law, there is no violation of 
the other state’s sovereignty; but if a state extends law into another state 
absent a recognized basis to do so under international law, it has exceeded 
its power under international law and infringed upon the sovereignty of the 
other state. States may disagree about what international law does or does 
not authorize on any given set of facts, but the arguments all proceed from 
the same basic, widely agreed upon jurisdictional principles involving 
sovereign entitlements recognized by international law.192 
The aim so far has been to add precision and analytical content to 
objections that exercises of extraterritorial jurisdiction interfere with 
sovereignty. Now that we know sovereignty is basically a description of the 
recognized powers of states under international law in this context, we can 
discern when it has been infringed by the exercise of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction. To return once again to our two-state hypothetical, if someone 
 
an international prescriptive jurisdiction prohibiting universal offenses that covers the globe. See infra 
Part III.D. 
191  Put aside the obvious political, military, and economic power differences. 
192  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402 
(listing bases of jurisdiction). Virtually all states agree, for example, that the principles set out in the 
Restatement—objective territoriality, subjective territoriality, active and passive personality, and the 
protective principle—authorize jurisdiction in some cases. It is whether the facts of a given case satisfy 
the jurisdictional principle invoked that tends to form the basis of disputes. 
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in State A fires a gun into State B and causes harm there, State B has 
jurisdiction, even though the conduct—the firing of the gun—technically 
took place in State A. Or if a State A national commits an act in State B 
contrary to State A law—for example child sex tourism193—State A may 
exercise jurisdiction over its national’s conduct abroad (State B of course 
also may exercise jurisdiction over acts committed in State B territory). 
None of these situations implies an infringement of the other state’s 
sovereignty since international law authorizes all states with these same 
jurisdictional competences. However, if there is no basis in international 
law for the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction—say, State A claims to 
regulate conduct by State B nationals entirely in State B with purely State B 
effects—there would be a violation of State B sovereignty. One possible 
way around the violation would be if the conduct constitutes a universal 
jurisdiction offense,194 a doctrine I will return to in the next Part. The 
important takeaway here is that if a state has a basis to regulate 
extraterritorially under international law, there is no violation of the other 
state’s sovereignty; but if a state does not have a recognized basis to 
regulate extraterritorially, the regulation infringes the other state’s 
sovereignty. 
The point should now start to emerge in sharper relief that if a state 
violates the principle of spatial legality, it risks violating other states’ 
sovereignties. This point ties directly back to the discussion above 
regarding the difference between adjudicative and prescriptive 
jurisdiction.195 Under a spatial legality analysis, absent a basis for 
prescribing law over defendant’s conduct X in State B when it occurs, State 
A may not apply its law to X even if State A gains custody (and hence 
adjudicative jurisdiction) over the defendant at some later point. This is a 
matter not only of the rights of the defendant, but also of the sovereignty of 
State B. By applying its law to defendant’s conduct X in State B, State A is 
retroactively projecting its law into State B territory in a way that exceeds 
State A’s prescriptive jurisdiction under international law, thereby 
infringing State B’s sovereignty. Spatial legality thus ties individual rights 
to sovereignty and sovereignty to individual rights in a way that reinforces 
both. 
Although this analysis innovatively links sovereignty and rights, I do 
not want to overstate the innovation. It may not always work this way. For 
example, some U.S. courts of appeals have held that application of U.S. law 
 
193  See, e.g., Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation (PROTECT) Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2423(c) (2006) (“Any United States citizen or alien admitted for permanent residence who travels in 
foreign commerce, and engages in any illicit sexual conduct with another person shall be fined under 
this title or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.”). For my views on the constitutionality of this 
provision, see Colangelo, supra note 46, at 995–1003, 1029–40. 
194  See infra Part III.D. 
195  See supra Part I. 
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to activity on the high seas with no U.S. connection satisfies due process 
where the U.S. government requests and receives consent from the vessel’s 
flag nation to board and apply U.S. law to the crew’s activities.196 In so 
holding, these courts have used sovereignty to potentially circumvent 
legality—specifically, they have used an agreement among sovereigns to 
apply a law to activity that otherwise did not apply but for the agreement. 
While flag-state consent may alleviate sovereignty concerns, it does not 
automatically quell fair notice concerns since the agreement among 
governments may occur irrespective of the expectations of the individual 
defendants to whom the law is being applied. More recently, other courts of 
appeals have pushed back against this trend, explaining that foreign 
government “consent to seize the members of [a foreign-flag vessel], 
remove them to the United States, and prosecute them under United States 
law in federal court does not eliminate the nexus requirement” under the 
Due Process Clause.197 Rather, for jurisdiction to be proper under the 
Clause, “the Government still needs to establish some detrimental effect 
within, or nexus to, the United States.”198 And because the government had 
failed to do so in the case before it, the court dismissed the indictment.199 
These cases illustrate a difference between a sovereignty-based 
jurisdiction approach and a rights-based jurisdiction approach. While the 
approaches often will coincide and reinforce each other since a violation of 
the right to fair notice generally will also imply a violation of sovereignty 
and vice versa, this may not always be so. A sovereign may always waive 
its own jurisdictional objections. But on a rights-based spatial legality 
analysis, it may not waive objections of individuals, at least not without fair 
notice. Spatial legality thus effectively takes extant rules of jurisdiction in 
multistate systems and transforms them into individual rights protections 
that provide fair notice of the potentially applicable law at the time of 
conduct. If the sovereign wishes to alter those jurisdictional rules for itself, 
it may do so at any time. It also may do so prospectively for individuals 
already subject to its jurisdiction in any number of ways.200 What it cannot 
do, however, is alter jurisdictional rules retroactively in a way that defeats 
parties’ expectations about the applicable law at the time of conduct. 
 
196  See United States v. Perez-Oviedo, 281 F.3d 400, 403 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. Cardales, 
168 F.3d 548, 553 (1st Cir. 1999). 
197  United States v. Perlaza, 439 F.3d 1149, 1169 (9th Cir. 2006). 
198  Id. 
199  Id. (“Until [such a] nexus is established, we cannot apply United States aiding-and-abetting 
law . . . .”). Interestingly, there may have been a basis in international law, at least for the boarding of 
the ship. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 108, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 
397. 
200  For example, states could enter into treaties with expansive provisions providing jurisdiction 
over their nationals by other states parties, absent any connection to the state asserting jurisdiction. See, 
e.g., supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
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The cases also raise interesting follow-up questions for spatial legality: 
even if a state had no jurisdiction over conduct where and when it occurred, 
could the state nonetheless apply its law if the conduct were also prohibited 
under the law where it occurred? Is it enough that the defendant had notice 
that the conduct was illegal? Or does the defendant also need notice that 
that particular state’s law might apply? The next Part fleshes out these and 
other questions about the scope and applicability of spatial legality on the 
current state of the law and supplies a way to analyze these types of 
questions going forward. 
III. TYPOLOGY 
This Part outlines a typology of spatial legality claims. The aim is not 
to propose any comprehensive doctrinal framework, but rather to sketch a 
guide for gauging the strength of a given claim in a given type of suit based 
on the law available right now. Thus as an initial matter we might suppose 
that spatial legality has stronger bite in criminal cases since legality 
principles generally have stronger bite in criminal law.201 Or what about 
where a state claims not to apply only forum law to activity abroad but an 
international law that purports to apply everywhere, as in cases of universal 
jurisdiction? Here spatial legality claims may have less bite if the state’s 
law faithfully incorporates international law. As these questions suggest, to 
discern whether and how strongly spatial legality applies requires drawing 
together different areas of law to construct and assess the claim. That is this 
Part’s project. 
Implicit in the project is that, like the doctrines it synthesizes, spatial 
legality is not a sharp, all-or-nothing proposition. Instead, as with ordinary 
legality, due process, or any other fairness doctrine, a claim’s strength will 
depend on the facts and the law of a given claim, reducing to some variant 
of whether notice was fair under the circumstances. To cobble together 
Supreme Court language on state choice of law, for example, “[w]hen 
considering fairness in this context,”202 the question is whether application 
of the law results in “unfair surprise or frustration of legitimate 
expectations.”203 This is vague but not vacuous and, like any jurisdictional 
test, its contours will congeal organically over time as cases get decided. 
But there are principled ways to distinguish some cases from others, and 
these distinctions in turn may augur more strongly in favor of spatial 
legality claims in some cases than in others. Moreover, just as spatial 
legality is a synthesized doctrine, so too is the typology, which weaves 
together public jurisdiction and private choice of law doctrines. 
 
201  See FULLER, supra note 5, at 57–58. 
202  Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 822 (1985). 
203  Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 318 n.24 (1981) (plurality opinion). 
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I construct four main categories, with the spatial legality claim moving 
from strongest to weakest: (1) “absolute conflicts” of law, (2) “true 
conflicts” of law, (3) “false conflicts” of law, and (4) “harmonization” of 
law. The “true” and “false” conflict categories nominally pull from the 
discipline of conflict of laws or private international law; however, my 
approach reorients them toward individual rights as opposed to state 
interests, which had initially inspired the categories in Brainerd Currie’s 
governmental-interest approach to choice of law questions (though Currie 
himself referred to false conflicts as “false problems”).204 For Currie, courts 
deciding choice of law questions should look at the state policies expressed 
in their laws and discern whether the involved states have an interest in 
applying their laws to the facts of the case.205 From this state-interest 
analysis, three categories emerge: false conflicts, true conflicts, and 
unprovided-for cases.206 False conflicts exist when only one state has an 
interest in applying its law.207 Because only one state is interested in 
applying its law, there is no conflict of laws and the sole interested state’s 
law applies.208 True conflicts exist when more than one state has an interest 
in applying its law.209 And unprovided-for cases exist when no state has an 
interest in applying its law.210 To restate the obvious, the categories are 
defined fundamentally according to state—not party—interests under 
Currie’s approach. 
I want to use the categories here in a different though not entirely novel 
way to evaluate individual rights by looking at the content of the laws 
themselves. As Justice Stevens explained in his concurrence in Shutts, there 
are other permutations of false conflict: “‘[F]alse conflict’ really means ‘no 
conflict of laws.’ If the laws of both states relevant to the set of facts are the 
same, or would produce the same decision in the lawsuit, there is no real 
conflict between them.”211 On the other hand, if the laws of the states differ 
and would produce different decisions, there is a true conflict of laws. 
 
204  See Brainerd Currie, Married Women’s Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 227, 253–55 (1958); Brainerd Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication Versus Automation 
in the Conflict of Laws, 10 STAN. L. REV. 205, 239–43 (1958). 
205  See Brainerd Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the 
Judicial Function, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 9, 9–10 (1958). 
206  See id. at 10 & n.3. Also, “[i]n his later work, Currie recognized a fourth category, what he 
called an ‘apparent conflict,’ which is something between a false and a true conflict.” Symeon C. 
Symeonides, The American Choice-of-Law Revolution in the Courts: Today and Tomorrow, 
298 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 44 (2002). 
207  See Currie, supra note 205, at 10. 
208  Id. 
209  EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 28 (4th ed. 2004). 
210  Id. 
211  Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 838 n.20 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring in part) 
(alteration in original) (quoting ROBERT A. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 93, at 188 (3d ed. 
1977)); see also Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 267, 290 (1966) (“[I]f the laws of [all involved] states, relevant to the set of facts, are the same . . . 
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I then add two new categories: “absolute conflicts” and 
“harmonization” of law. An absolute conflict exists where one state’s law 
prohibits what another state’s law requires, such that it is impossible to 
comply with both laws at once. In this sense, an absolute conflict is a 
stronger species of true conflict, which is where one state’s law prohibits 
what another state’s law merely permits (but does not require). 
Harmonization represents the opposite pole of the spectrum and 
contemplates the same law operative in both states. It is a stronger species 
of false conflict because the law not only looks the same; it is the same. 
These four categories offer a useful guide for gauging the strength of spatial 
legality claims. 
A. Absolute Conflicts 
An absolute conflict of laws exists where forum law prohibits what 
foreign law in the place where conduct occurs requires. For example, State 
A prohibits X while State B compels X, and X occurs in State B. There is no 
way to simultaneously comply with both State A and State B law regarding 
X. The Supreme Court has described this situation as one in which 
defendants claim “[foreign] law requires them to act in some fashion 
prohibited by the law of the United States or claim that their compliance 
with the laws of both countries is otherwise impossible.”212 Although the 
idea surfaces in different areas via different doctrines,213 perhaps the most 
 
then there is no real conflict of laws at all, and the case ought to be decided under the law that is 
common to [the] states.”). For cases utilizing this permutation of false conflict, see, for example, 
Wachsman ex rel. Wachsman v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, 537 F. Supp. 2d 85, 94 (D.D.C. 2008); Gulf Grp. 
Holdings, Inc. v. Coast Asset Mgmt. Corp., 516 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1271 (S.D. Fla. 2007); Greaves v. 
State Farm Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 12, 14 (D.D.C. 1997); and Brenner v. Oppenheimer & Co., 44 P.3d 
364, 372–73 (Kan. 2002). 
212  Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 799 (1993) (citation omitted); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403 cmt. e, § 415 cmt. j 
(1987) (describing provisions that apply only when compliance with the laws of two sovereigns, both 
validly claiming jurisdiction over an activity, is impossible). It is worth pointing out that the Supreme 
Court in Hartford Fire called this type of situation a “true conflict,” which is in my view clearly wrong 
from a conflict of laws perspective. See Colangelo, supra note 154, at 1042. The Court also felt that, 
because the foreign conduct was permitted but not compelled by foreign law in that case, the foreign 
defendant had failed to meet this threshold. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 788–89. I will refer to the 
situation presented in Hartford Fire in the next Part, appropriately, as a “true conflict.” 
213  See, e.g., Mahoney v. RFE/RL, Inc., 47 F.3d 447, 447–48 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“If an American 
corporation operating in a foreign country would have to ‘violate the laws’ of that country in order to 
comply with the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1), the company need not 
comply with the Act.”). The “foreign laws” exception to the Act states: 
 It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment agency, or labor organization— 
 (1) to take any action otherwise prohibited under subsections (a), (b), (c), or (e) of this section 
where . . . such practices involve an employee in a workplace in a foreign country, and compliance 
with such subsections would cause such employer, or a corporation controlled by such employer, 
to violate the laws of the country in which such workplace is located . . . . 
29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2006). Congress built in the defense to “avoid placing overseas employers in the 
impossible position of having to conform to two inconsistent legal regimes, one imposed from the 
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self-evident is the aptly named “foreign sovereign compulsion doctrine,” 
which “recognizes that a defendant trying to do business under conflicting 
legal regimes may be caught between the proverbial rock and a hard place 
where compliance with one country’s laws results in violation of 
another’s.”214 Under this doctrine, courts will not apply U.S. law prohibiting 
a party’s foreign activity where the party shows that the conduct was 
actually compelled by foreign law (and not just encouraged or approved).215 
The doctrine’s underpinnings hold significance for spatial legality 
claims. Courts have considered it alongside the act of state doctrine, which 
bars U.S. courts from sitting in judgment of public acts of another sovereign 
in its own borders.216 This doctrinal connection makes sense: if foreign law 
compels the foreign activity, then overriding the application of foreign law 
would be tantamount to U.S. courts invalidating the public act of another 
sovereign in its own territory.217 But the two doctrines serve different 
purposes. While “[t]he act of state doctrine derives from both separation of 
powers and respect for the sovereignty of other nations,”218 courts have 
found that foreign sovereign compulsion stems from individual rights. 
“Rather than being concerned with the diplomatic implications of 
condemning another country’s official acts,” the doctrine instead “focuses 
on the plight of a defendant who is subject to conflicting legal obligations 
under two sovereign states.”219 In this respect, the doctrinal anchor is 
fairness and, more specifically, due process.220 To be sure, the Supreme 
 
United States and the other imposed by the country in which the company operates.” Mahoney, 47 F.3d 
at 450. 
214  In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 584 F. Supp. 2d 546, 551 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 441–442. 
215  Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 584 F. Supp. 2d at 550–51; Trugman-Nash, Inc. v. N.Z. Dairy Bd., 
954 F. Supp. 733, 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding “an actual and material conflict between American . . . 
and New Zealand law” entitling defendants to invoke “foreign sovereign compulsion,” and dismissing 
claims); Interamerican Ref. Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291, 1298–99 (D. Del. 
1970). 
216  See Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 700 (2004); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. 
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964); Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897). 
217  See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 606 (9th Cir. 1976) 
(“A corollary to the act of state doctrine in the foreign trade antitrust field is the often-recognized 
principle that corporate conduct which is compelled by a foreign sovereign is also protected from 
antitrust liability, as if it were an act of the state itself.”). 
218  Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 584 F. Supp. 2d at 550. 
219  Id. at 551; accord Mahoney v. RFE/RL, Inc., 47 F.3d 447, 450 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“[Section] 
623(f)(1)’s evident purpose [is] to avoid placing overseas employers in the impossible position of having 
to conform to two inconsistent legal regimes, one imposed from the United States and the other imposed 
by the country in which the company operates.”). 
220  See Don Wallace, Jr. & Joseph P. Griffin, Commentary, The Restatement and Foreign Sovereign 
Compulsion: A Plea for Due Process, 23 INT’L LAW. 593, 594–95 (1989) (noting that foreign sovereign 
compulsion is based on both due process and comity, and criticizing the Restatement for not 
emphasizing “due process/fairness components” in its sections on the doctrine, which “sometimes leads 
to a blurring of the foreign sovereign compulsion and the act of state doctrine”). 
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Court case originating the doctrine, Societe Internationale pour 
Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, held that 
compelling a party to violate a foreign sovereign’s laws in foreign 
sovereign territory would deprive that party of due process under the Fifth 
Amendment.221 
Significantly, in all of the cases that have used foreign sovereign 
compulsion to reject application of U.S. law, there was no dispute that the 
United States had jurisdiction to regulate the foreign conduct in question. 
Thus, even where the United States has jurisdiction to regulate foreign 
conduct, due process may block the application of U.S. law if it would put 
parties in a legally impossible position. By contrast, spatial legality 
presupposes the absence of U.S. prescriptive jurisdiction at the time of 
conduct. If due process precludes the application of U.S. law where the 
United States has prescriptive jurisdiction over foreign conduct in absolute 
conflict of laws situations, it a fortiori precludes the application of U.S. law 
where the United States did not have prescriptive jurisdiction at the time of 
conduct. Not only would the party who later finds herself in U.S. court be 
put in a legally impossible position, the party would not even have known 
of the legal impossibility when she acted in a way that was, again, 
compelled by the law governing the place of the conduct. It is difficult to 
imagine a scenario more deserving of due process protection through a 
spatial legality claim than where a local law coerces someone to engage in 
activity for which she is later punished under a foreign and exactly opposite 
law she had no reasonable expectation would apply to her conduct when 
she engaged in it. 
B. True Conflicts 
A true conflict of laws exists where forum law prohibits what foreign 
law in the place where conduct occurs permits (but does not require). Or, 
put with more commanding concision by the Supreme Court in the 
interstate context in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. 
Campbell, “[a] State cannot punish a defendant for conduct that may have 
been lawful where it occurred.”222 Although the Court cited Shutts in partial 
support for this rule,223 which invalidated a state court’s use of lawful out-
of-state conduct in a punitive damages calculation, the Court couched the 
 
221  357 U.S. 197, 211 (1958) (“It is hardly debatable that fear of criminal prosecution constitutes a 
weighty excuse for nonproduction, and this excuse is not weakened because the laws preventing 
compliance are those of a foreign sovereign.”). I should note that the cases in this area also require good 
faith. Thus, if the party attempts to use foreign law to evade U.S. law, the defense will not apply. See id. 
at 210; see also Wallace & Griffin, supra note 220, at 599 (“Foreign sovereign compulsion also requires 
good faith by the party invoking the doctrine.”). 
222  538 U.S. 408, 421 (2003). 
223  Id. at 421–22; see Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 821–22 (1985). 
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rule largely in sovereignty terms.224 Yet the rule can function as an 
individual rights shield as well, the idea being that an individual who 
engages in lawful conduct in one state having no nexus to another state 
cannot be punished by the latter state for that conduct.225 A contrary rule not 
only would, to borrow from Campbell, impermissibly extend the punishing 
state’s “power or supervision over the internal affairs of another State,”226 
thus exceeding its “orbit[] of . . . lawful authority,”227 but also would, to 
borrow from Hague, risk “unfair surprise or frustration of legitimate 
expectations” of parties.228 In this respect, the multisovereign system 
operates to shore up individual rights. 
Like absolute conflicts, true conflicts trigger spatial legality 
problems.229 The problem is perhaps not as stark as in the absolute conflict 
situation, but the rationale is the same. When activity in conformity with 
local law is later subject to a prohibition in a state with no jurisdictional 
nexus to the activity when it occurred, parties reasonably may have lacked 
notice that the foreign prohibition would apply to their conduct. Such a 
situation gives rise to the “unacceptability in principle of imposing criminal 
liability where the prototypically law-abiding individual in the actor’s 
situation would have had no reason to act otherwise.”230 
At first blush, these situations may not seem like especially acute 
problems since they presuppose no jurisdictional nexus with the punishing 
state. And where there is a nexus, defendants can be deemed on notice. Yet 
we have already seen a number of examples on the civil side in the U.S. 
interstate context: Dick, Yates, and Shutts were all “true conflicts,” at least 
in the sense that forum law imposed some rule that did not exist under the 
otherwise applicable law, and as a result, the Supreme Court invalidated the 
applications of forum law in those cases as fundamentally unfair.231 
 
224  See Campbell, 538 U.S. at 422 (“A basic principle of federalism is that each State may make its 
own reasoned judgment about what conduct is permitted or proscribed within its borders . . . .”). 
225  Cf. id. (explaining that the forum courts erred by “award[ing] punitive damages to punish and 
deter conduct that bore no relation to the . . . harm” in the forum). 
226  Id. at 421 (quoting Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 824 (1975)). 
227  Id. (quoting N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149, 161 (1914)). 
228  Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 318 n.24 (1981) (plurality opinion). 
229  Cf. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 359–60 (1964) (“It would be a rare situation in 
which the meaning of a statute of another State sufficed to afford a person ‘fair warning’ that his own 
State’s statute meant something quite different from what its words said.”). 
230  Jeffries, supra note 3, at 211–12. As Jeffries continues, “The person who has been treated 
unjustly is . . . the person who somehow runs afoul of a penal statute by doing nothing out of the 
ordinary.” Id. at 231. Even in purely domestic situations, the Supreme Court, quoting Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, has observed that “[a] law which punished conduct which would not be blameworthy in the 
average member of the community” may violate due process. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 229–
30 (1957) (quoting OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 50 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 
1881)). 
231  See supra Part I. As civil cases, these cases dealt with the scope of liability and recovery, as 
opposed to criminal prohibitions. 
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Nonetheless, for logistical and evidentiary reasons, these cases may tend to 
self-deter; it may be too much of a burden to prove, for example, that my 
First Amendment-protected speech in the United States to other U.S. 
persons violates, say, German hate speech law232 or Pakistani blasphemy 
law233 should I someday visit those countries. 
The analysis gets trickier when the nexus itself becomes more plastic. 
The Internet for example holds massive potential to exacerbate these types 
of problems precisely because it can be understood to connect every 
statement posted on the web to every jurisdiction in the world. A ready 
illustration would be aggressive libel laws whose jurisdictional provisions 
can vacuum up “publications” from every nook and cranny of the web.234 
English libel law, for instance, “is generally regarded as the most claimant-
friendly in the world,”235 and authorizes jurisdiction over defendants 
temporarily in England or when the damage occurs there.236 Substantively, 
this exceedingly claimant-friendly law makes it exceedingly easy to show 
damage, since “English courts take the view that material on the Internet is 
published in England whenever it can be downloaded in England. There is 
no requirement of targeting.”237 Consequently, as Trevor Hartley explains, 
“Since all material on the Internet can normally be downloaded anywhere, 
this means that all material on the Internet is regarded as being published in 
England.”238 Even books that are not themselves published in England but 
that can be ordered over the Internet by English residents qualify as 
“publications” under this rule.239 Accordingly, “if one American resident 
puts material on the Internet that allegedly libels another American resident, 
the latter may sue for libel in England”240—even if the allegedly libelous 
material is protected under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.241 
 
232  See STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], Nov. 13, 1998, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I 
[BGBL. I] 3322, as amended, §§ 86, 130, translated in BUNDESMINISTERIUM DER JUSTIZ (Michael 
Bohlander, trans. 2011), available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/index.html. 
233  See Act XLV of 1860, PAK. PENAL CODE (2000), v. 1, ch. XV, translated in PAK. PENAL CODE, 
1860, at 260 (Dr. C.M. Hanif ed., 2000). 
234  The term “publication” can be quite broad under foreign law. Under English law, “each time an 
item is communicated to another person, there is a ‘publication[.’] Each sale of a newspaper is a separate 
publication in English eyes; and each time a viewer watches a television program there is also a 
‘publication[.’] The place of publication is the place where this occurs.” Trevor C. Hartley, ‘Libel 
Tourism’ and Conflict of Laws, 59 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 25, 26 (2010) (footnote omitted). 
235  Id. 
236  Id. at 29. 
237  Id. at 30. 
238  Id. 
239  Id. 
240  Id. The claimant must have a reputation in England before he can sue there. Id. 
241  Cf. Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz, 881 N.E.2d 830, 834 (N.Y. 2007) (“Plaintiff and her amici argue 
that this case is about ‘libel tourism,’ a phenomenon that they variously describe as the use of libel 
judgments procured in jurisdictions with claimant-friendly libel laws—and little or no connection to the 
author or purported libelous material—to chill free speech in the United States. However pernicious the 
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One could imagine similar results where foreign countries criminalize the 
speech in question.242 Thus conceptually, true conflicts raise spatial legality 
problems when conduct permitted where it takes place has no nexus to the 
forum that later seeks to punish it. But the collateral question of whether 
there is a nexus may turn out to be a contentious legal and factual issue. A 
more difficult first-order conceptual choice presents itself where both the 
law of the place where the conduct occurs and the law of the forum prohibit 
the defendant’s conduct, i.e., the false conflict. 
C. False Conflicts 
A false conflict of laws exists where forum law and foreign law in the 
place where conduct occurs are distinct laws but reflect substantially the 
same rule. Say State A and State B prohibit murder in substantially the same 
manner. For analytical cleanliness, let us stipulate that the punishments are 
also substantially similar.243 Whether the person who commits murder in 
State B with no connection to State A nonetheless may be prosecuted for 
that act under State A law depends on how the court views the relevant 
notice criteria. More specifically, the question becomes whether the right to 
fair notice includes notice of the applicable law (State A law) or notice only 
of the legal prohibition (against murder). The law in this area is somewhat 
schizophrenic. 
We saw already that the Ninth Circuit refused to extend U.S. law to 
drug smuggling on a foreign flag vessel with no nexus to the United States 
even where the foreign government specifically consented to U.S. 
jurisdiction.244 As a matter of due process, the court found that the defendant 
“would have a legitimate expectation that because he has submitted himself 
to the laws of one nation, other nations will not be entitled to exercise 
jurisdiction without some nexus.”245 On the other hand, the Second Circuit 
 
effect of this practice may be, our duty here is to determine wither defendant’s New York contacts 
establish a proper basis for jurisdiction . . . .”), aff’d, 518 F.3d 102, 104 (2d Cir. 2008) (“The Court of 
Appeals acknowledged the potentially ‘pernicious’ effect of what plaintiff Ehrenfeld called ‘libel 
tourism’ . . . to chill free speech in the United States.”); David Partlett & Barbara McDonald, 
International Publications and Protection of Reputation: A Margin of Appreciation but Not 
Subservience?, 62 ALA. L. REV. 477, 487 (2011) (providing other similar examples of libel tourism). 
242  See supra notes 232–33 and accompanying text. 
243  Cf., e.g., United States v. Waseta, 647 F.3d 980, 988 (10th Cir. 2011) (applying ex post facto 
principles regarding a criminal sentence and concluding that “a defendant may be deemed to have fair 
notice of his post-[change-in-law] sentence so long as the sentence imposed is not wildly different than a 
sentence that might well have been imposed” under the previous law (internal quotation mark omitted)); 
United States v. Lata, 415 F.3d 107, 112 (1st Cir. 2005). For an analysis of the punishment component 
to the principle in international law, see Dana, supra note 4. 
244  See supra notes 197–99. 
245  United States v. Perlaza, 439 F.3d 1149, 1168 (9th Cir. 2006) (alteration omitted) (quoting 
United States v. Klimavicius-Viloria, 144 F.3d 1249, 1257 (9th Cir. 1998)). Notably, this due process 
protection would not apply to persons on stateless vessels, precisely because “where a defendant 
attempts to avoid the law of all nations by travelling on a stateless vessel, he has forfeited these 
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recently ruled in an arms trafficking case, United States v. al Kassar, that 
“[f]air warning does not require that the defendants understand that they 
could be subject to criminal prosecution in the United States so long as they 
would reasonably understand that their conduct was criminal and would 
subject them to prosecution somewhere.”246 An added twist is that the 
Second Circuit had previously and explicitly adopted the Ninth Circuit’s 
nexus requirement in a case involving foreign airplane bombing,247 a 
decision I have critiqued elsewhere.248 If, according to al Kassar, a U.S. 
nexus does not serve to ensure defendants have notice that U.S. law may 
apply to their conduct—since all they need to understand is that their 
conduct “would subject them to prosecution somewhere”249—it is unclear 
what purpose the nexus serves. As a legal requirement, it seems totally 
meaningless. Alternatively, if the nexus somehow applies to plane bombers 
but not to arms traffickers, it is just bizarre. 
In any event, the difference between the two approaches above 
highlights the difference between the relevant notice criteria—notice of the 
applicable law versus notice that conduct is prohibited. The Ninth Circuit 
adopted the former test while the Second Circuit adopted the latter. Indeed, 
the Second Circuit appeared to dismiss altogether the idea that defendants 
need any notice at all that U.S. law might apply to their conduct so long as 
the conduct is “self-evidently criminal.”250 In support, the court cited Bouie 
v. City of Columbia, a Supreme Court case involving temporal legality that, 
as we know, reiterated “[t]he fundamental principle that ‘the required 
criminal law must have existed when the conduct in issue occurred.’”251 Or, 
stated with a bit more flourish: “No one can be criminally punished in this 
country, except according to a law prescribed for his government by the 
sovereign authority before the imputed offence was committed, and which 
existed as a law at the time.”252 Al Kassar thus cited a case about fair notice 
in time but elided the question of fair notice in space; namely, whether “one 
can be criminally punished in this country, . . . according to a law 
prescribed for his government by the sovereign authority” where the offense 
takes place completely outside of, and has no nexus to, that sovereign 
 
protections . . . and can be charged with the knowledge that he has done so.” United States v. Caicedo, 
47 F.3d 370, 372–73 (9th Cir. 1995). 
246  660 F.3d 108, 119 (2d Cir. 2011). 
247  See United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 111 (2d Cir. 2003) (“The Ninth Circuit has held that 
‘[i]n order to apply extraterritorially a federal criminal statute to a defendant consistently with due 
process, there must be a sufficient nexus between the defendant and the United States, so that such 
application would not be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair.’ We agree.” (alteration in original) (citation 
omitted) (quoting United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248–49 (9th Cir. 1990))). 
248  See Colangelo, supra note 154, at 1092–98. 
249  al Kassar, 660 F.3d at 119. 
250  Id. 
251  378 U.S. 347, 354 (1964) (quoting HALL, supra note 1, at 58–59). 
252  Id. at 353 n.4 (quoting Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 235 (1883)). 
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authority. And al Kassar also failed to mention Bouie’s explicit rejection of 
the use of another state’s law to supply notice in that case.253 
Nonetheless, lower courts have begun to apply al Kassar’s rationale in 
short order.254 In United States v. Ahmed, the Southern District of New York 
recently upheld charges of materially supporting and receiving military 
training from a designated foreign terrorist organization under U.S. law 
against an Eritrean national abroad, despite the fact that “[t]he indictment 
[did] not allege that the defendant engaged or intended to engage in specific 
acts either within the United States or directed at its citizens or property 
here or in other countries.”255 It was enough—under al Kassar—that the 
defendant’s “acts [were] ‘self-evidently criminal.’ . . . Thus, the Due 
Process challenge fail[ed].”256 
This leads to a follow-up inquiry if courts adopt a false-conflict model 
requiring notice only of the prohibition but not the applicable law: Is the 
conduct actually prohibited under foreign law? In my view, this inquiry 
requires that courts in fact look to the foreign law. If supporting the 
particular foreign organization is not illegal in the place where such support 
occurs, there is a true conflict.257 This scenario is not farfetched; the 
Supreme Court recently held that supporting even lawful, peaceful activities 
of an organization, like training “on how to use humanitarian and 
international law to peacefully resolve disputes” or “how to petition various 
representative bodies such as the United Nations for relief,” are punishable 
crimes under the material support statute.258 It is not enough simply to say 
the conduct is “self-evidently criminal”; the court must conclude that the 
conduct is prohibited in substantially the same way under the law where it 
took place. The analysis would be akin to what courts do in civil choice of 
law cases when they discern false conflicts because the laws of the involved 
states are the same,259 or in criminal extradition cases under the “dual 
criminality” principle, which provides that “extradition does not go forward 
unless the acts charged constitute a serious crime . . . under the law of both 
 
253  See supra text accompanying notes 31–33. 
254  In al Kassar itself, there was a U.S. nexus. Al Kassar, 660 F.3d at 118 (finding that the aim of 
extraterritorial conspiracy was “to harm U.S. citizens and interests and to threaten the security of the 
United States”). 
255  No. 10 CR. 131 (PKC), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123182, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2011). 
256  Id. at *8. 
257  See supra Part III.B. 
258  Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2729 (2010). Interestingly, the Court used 
Congress’s findings that “numerous multilateral conventions in force provid[e] universal prosecutive 
jurisdiction over persons involved in a variety of terrorist acts, including hostage taking, murder of an 
internationally protected person, and aircraft piracy and sabotage” to support its holding. Id. at 2726 
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2339B findings and purpose (2006)). But none of the multilateral conventions 
prohibit the conduct at issue in Humanitarian Law Project. 
259  See supra note 211. 
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the requesting and the requested state.”260 Some European countries call this 
approach the “vicarious administration of justice” principle, and it requires 
a tight fit between the law of the prosecuting state and the law of the state 
where the offense occurred, including identical norms and elements of the 
offense, and use of the locus state’s justifications and excuses, specifically 
because “the perpetrator could not have known of the applicability of 
foreign law.”261 If the law where the conduct occurred did not prohibit the 
conduct at the time it occurred, there is a spatial legality problem. The only 
way around the problem would be if the conduct also constitutes a universal 
jurisdiction offense under international law, to which we now turn. 
D. Harmonization 
Harmonization of laws exists where forum law and foreign law in the 
place where conduct occurs are fundamentally the same law. This situation 
arises most notably, though not exclusively, in cases of universal 
jurisdiction. The state properly exercising universal jurisdiction is by 
definition not applying just its national law to foreign conduct, but also an 
international law that applies everywhere and prohibits offenses including 
piracy, genocide, torture, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and terrorist 
acts like bombing and hijacking airplanes.262 According to this principle, 
state practice and opinio juris, or the intent or belief that the practice has 
legal effect, have combined to denominate these offenses as contrary to 
international law and to authorize jurisdiction by all states,263 evidenced also 
by the fact that the overwhelming majority of states in the world are party 
to treaties prohibiting the offenses and authorizing jurisdiction by all states 
parties.264 Indeed, the only reason the state can claim jurisdiction to begin 
with over conduct having no relation at all to that state is that it is not 
extending purely national law to the conduct, but rather acts as a 
 
260  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 476 cmt. d 
(1987); see also John G. Kester, Some Myths of United States Extradition Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 1441, 1459 
(1988) (“A maxim of international law, and a standard provision in nearly every United States 
extradition treaty, is that extradition will not take place unless the offense charged is a crime in both the 
demanding and the requested country.”). Notably, “the offense charged must have been a serious crime 
in both states at the time it was committed.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF 
THE UNITED STATES § 476 cmt. d. 
261  Jürgen Meyer, The Vicarious Administration of Justice: An Overlooked Basis of Jurisdiction, 
31 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 108, 111, 116 (1990). 
262  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404; see THE 
PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 29 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2001). 
263  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404 cmts. 
a–b (describing the order in which universal jurisdiction offenses have become “customary international 
law,” a designation that incorporates state practice and opinion juris). 
264  See Anthony J. Colangelo, The Legal Limits of Universal Jurisdiction, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 149, 
186–98 (2006) (detailing in an appendix the multilateral treaties covering universal jurisdiction crimes, 
including number of state parties). 
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decentralized enforcer of an international law that covers the globe.265 In 
turn, no spatial legality problem arises in cases of existing universal 
jurisdiction offenses because the applicable law—international law—is the 
same everywhere. 
A U.S. Supreme Court case from 1820, United States v. Furlong,266 
provides an early and sophisticated illustration of this point. Furlong 
addressed in dicta whether a double jeopardy defense would attach between 
different sovereigns regarding the universal jurisdiction offense of piracy on 
the one hand and the parochial offense of murder on the other. At the time, 
piracy was deemed outside the national jurisdiction of any state.267 Pirates 
were, according to the Court, stateless “persons[] on board . . . vessels[] 
which throw off their national character by cruizing piratically[] and 
committing piracy on other vessels.”268 The offense thus was not 
“committed against the particular sovereignty of a foreign power; but . . . 
against all nations, including the United States.”269 As a result, all states 
could prosecute piracy, not under national jurisdiction, but rather under 
“universal jurisdiction” to enforce the law of nations, or international law.270 
Murder, by contrast, was a parochial offense over which each state had 
national jurisdiction when the offense involved the state’s national territory 
or persons.271 The Court noted that because piracy 
is considered as an offence within the criminal jurisdiction of all nations[,] [i]t 
is against all, and punished by all; and there can be no doubt that the plea of 
autre fois acquit [already acquitted] would be good in any civilized State, 
though resting on a prosecution instituted in the Courts of any other civilized 
State. Not so with the crime of murder.272  
Because unlike piracy, murder “is punishable under the laws of each 
State, . . . an acquittal in [the defendant’s] case would not have been a good 
plea in the Court of Great Britain.”273 
 
265  This argument was originally spelled out in Colangelo, supra note 264, and has been explicitly 
adopted by courts in recent cases addressing universal jurisdiction. See United States v. Ali, Cr. No. 11-
0106, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96889, at *19 (D.D.C. July 13, 2012) (finding universal jurisdiction over 
piracy off the coast of Somalia); United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599, 608 (E.D. Va. 2010) 
(same); In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 256 & n.139 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (finding 
universal jurisdiction over Apartheid-related crimes in South Africa). In a sense, this subsection 
integrates my work on universal jurisdiction in U.S. and international law into a discussion about 
legality and extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
266  18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184 (1820). 
267  See United States v. Klintock, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 144, 152 (1820). 
268  Id. at 144; see United States v. Holmes, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 412, 417–19 (1820). 
269  Klintock, 18 U.S. at 152. 
270  Furlong, 18 U.S. at 197. 
271  Id. 
272  Id. 
273  Id. (emphasis added). 
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The Court’s different treatment of piracy and murder centers on the 
nature of universal jurisdiction and, more specifically, on the conceptual 
move that when states exercise such jurisdiction they apply international 
law. On this rationale, if one state already applied the international law 
against piracy, another state cannot apply that same law again. Such a 
prosecution would constitute the paradigmatic double jeopardy violation—
multiple prosecutions for the same offense under the same law 
(international law). But as to murder, because each state has its own 
separate national law prohibiting that offense—when it takes place on the 
state’s territory or involves its nationals—each state may independently 
enforce its law.274 The latter scenario is the well-known doctrine of “dual 
sovereignty” in U.S. law: “When a defendant in a single act violates the 
‘peace and dignity’ of two sovereigns by breaking the laws of each, he has 
committed two distinct ‘offences’ . . . for each of which he is justly 
punishable.”275 The point for present purposes is that universal jurisdiction 
depends fundamentally on the application of international law and that law 
is the same everywhere, erasing any fair notice problem.276 
This way of viewing universal jurisdiction has continued to the present 
day. For example, European courts that exercise universal criminal 
jurisdiction purport to do so on the ground that, to use the Spanish 
Constitutional Court’s language, “[t]he international . . . repression sought 
through the principle of universal justice is based exclusively on the 
particular characteristics of the crimes covered thereby, whose harm 
(paradigmatically in the case of genocide) transcends the specific victims 
and affects the [I]nternational [C]ommunity as a whole.”277 And in the 
United States, where universal jurisdiction in civil suits has exploded into a 
 
274  For a comprehensive elaboration of this double jeopardy theory in both U.S. and international 
law, see Anthony J. Colangelo, Double Jeopardy and Multiple Sovereigns: A Jurisdictional Theory, 
86 WASH. U. L. REV. 769, 779 (2009). 
275  Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
276  O’Keefe, supra note 113, at 759 (“[Where] subsequent nationality and subsequent residency 
jurisdiction are actually, and merely, exercises of national criminal jurisdiction on the basis of 
universality over crimes under general international law—and, critically, over crimes that existed under 
general international law at the moment of their commission—they do not in any way infringe the 
prohibition on ex post facto criminalization embodied in international human rights law.”). Moreover, as 
a choice of law matter, sovereignty concerns in this situation are substantially diminished or eliminated 
altogether since “no other State will have a legitimate contrary interest expressed in its laws. Either other 
States simply will not have laws contrary to the international norms proscribing universal crimes as a 
practical matter; or they cannot as a legal matter.” Colangelo, False Conflict, supra note 8, at 899–900. 
This is not to say that other states with closer ties to the offense will not have objections to the choice of 
forum, but that is a different issue. My argument here concerns only the choice of law. 
277  S.T.C., Sept. 26, 2005 (B.O.E. 2005, No. 258) (Spain), available at http://hj.
tribunalconstitucional.es/HJ/docs/BOE/BOE-T-2005-17753.pdf, translated in Constitutional Court 
Judgment No. 237/2005, of September 26, http://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/en/jurisprudencia/
restrad/Pages/JCC2372005.aspx. 
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major legal and policy debate through the Alien Tort Statute (ATS)278—a 
debate now before the Supreme Court279—lower courts have justified 
entertaining suits by foreigners against foreigners for conduct abroad on the 
theory that “ATS jurisdiction [i]s limited to claims in violation of 
universally accepted norms” under international law.280 That is, “[t]he 
norms being applied under the ATS are international, not domestic, ones, 
derived from international law. . . . [Thus,] the ATS provides a domestic 
forum for claims based on conduct that is illegal everywhere, including the 
place where that conduct took place.”281 
Of course, if a state purporting to exercise universal jurisdiction 
extends the offense definition beyond its extant definition in international 
law or makes up a new universal jurisdiction offense unsupported by 
existing international law, there is a problem: the defendant may not have 
been on notice of the prohibition, unless the state where the conduct 
occurred also had the same prohibition.282 But where states faithfully 
incorporate existing international law against universal jurisdiction offenses 
into national law and apply it to foreign conduct, even conduct that bears no 
nexus to the prosecuting state, there is no spatial legality problem. The 
defendant was on notice of the applicable law—international law—at the 
time of the conduct.283 
CONCLUSION 
States are asserting extraterritorial regulatory power now more than 
ever. This unprecedented and increasingly aggressive phenomenon calls out 
for a legal analysis that incorporates not just state interests but also 
individual rights. And the analysis must come immediately, as mix-ups 
metastasize between adjudicative and prescriptive jurisdiction that 
surreptitiously underpin exorbitant claims to regulate conduct abroad. This 
Article synthesized principles of legality and jurisdiction to lay a bedrock 
concept from which individual rights arguments may build. And it gave 
such arguments not only theoretical cogency but also doctrinal grounding 
so that parties have available viable legal arguments in U.S. courts. In doing 
 
278  28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action 
by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”). 
279  See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 
472 (2011). 
280  Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 746 (9th Cir. 2011). 
281  Id. 
282  In which case, the situation might be categorized as a “false conflict.” See supra Part III.C. 
283  I have argued that in U.S. constitutional law, universal jurisdiction interacts with the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause in this way. See Colangelo, Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction, supra note 8, at 170–76. Courts seem receptive to this argument. See Goldberg v. UBS AG, 
690 F. Supp. 2d 92, 109 (E.D.N.Y. 2010); accord United States v. Emmanuel, No. 06-20758-CR-
ALTONAGA/Turnoff, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48510, at *45 n.10 (S.D. Fla. July 5, 2007) (order on 
defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment). 
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so, the Article reformatted rule of law criteria regarding fair notice in the 
domestic system for the international system, and cast that fair notice right 
across space as well as time via extant jurisdictional rules among the states 
comprising the system. 
This is only the beginning. Domestic systems have held dear rule of 
law criteria like fair notice for some time. Indeed, I used its manifestations 
in the U.S. domestic system to analogically bolster arguments about U.S. 
jurisdiction in the international system. Yet the growing phenomenon of 
extraterritoriality, and the growing amount of jurisdictional overlap that 
invariably will attend it, are placing novel and urgent demands on the rule 
of law in the international system. The crucial questions for scholars, 
courts, and litigants now, in both national and international law, are whether 
and how traditional rule of law criteria can be translated to meet these 
demands in a system poised to subject actors to a potentially massive and 
conflicting amount of jurisdictional overlap.284 For as states continue to 
push against limits customarily observed on the geographic reach of their 
laws, the jurisdictional rules themselves will evolve to permit ever-
expansive regulation. At present and for the foreseeable future, spatial 
legality’s fair notice criterion may act as a rule of law constraint; as long as 
every state’s law does not apply everywhere, it will have some traction. But 
because fair notice of the law is itself a function of jurisdictional rules, and 
those rules may evolve, it cannot operate alone. It protects parties’ 
expectations by freezing jurisdictional rules at the time of conduct but says 
nothing about the development of those rules. In this respect, it is an 
endogenous limit within the law on how states may exercise jurisdiction 
after conduct occurs, not an exogenous limit on the future development of 
the law. 
Yet how the law develops may generate other legality problems. For 
instance, in a world of rampant extraterritoriality, the constraint of fair 
notice may fall away and compliance may take its place. In such a world, 
the “absolute conflict” situation—in which actors are subject to opposing 
legal commands such that they cannot comply with both—is a variant of the 
formal rule of law element of avoiding contradiction in the law.285 Only here 
it is not one contradictory law emanating from one sovereign but multiple 
contradictory laws emanating from multiple sovereigns. Moreover, the 
ever-increasing potential for jurisdictional overlap and “true conflicts” of 
 
284  Accord Waldron, supra note 5, at 26 (“The character of the [international law] constraint will no 
doubt be determined, formally and procedurally (if not substantively), by the ideal of the Rule of Law, 
adapted to the international context. Accordingly, it is a matter of some urgency—which more or less 
implies these days that legal philosophers are going to neglect it—to consider what that adaptation of 
this ideal to the international context involves.”). I am not addressing the deeper jurisprudential question 
of whether international law is “law.” For an insightful recent addition to this literature, see Oona 
Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, Outcasting: Enforcement in Domestic and International Law, 121 YALE 
L.J. 252 (2011). 
285  For the best-known account in the domestic system, see FULLER, supra note 5, at 65–66. 
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laws invites rethinking away from state interests and toward individual 
rights.286 Here the rule of law may take on a protective role of ensuring 
liberty of behavior and movement287 in the face of otherwise paralyzing 
burdens imposed by concurrent regulatory regimes. These liberty rights 
have systemic dimensions as well because they facilitate commerce and the 
efficient allocation of resources within the system, maximizing overall 
welfare.288 Finally, as substantive international law expands to regulate 
more activity, and as states seek to apply this “harmonized” international 
law more in domestic courts, the law opens itself up to already mounting 
objections of “fragmentation”289 in the sense that the more numerous and 
diverse the bodies purporting to determine and apply international law, the 
more fragmented and inconsistent that law will become. The conceptual and 
lawyerly challenge going forward will be how best to analyze and resolve 
these types of conundrums290 in order to effectively adapt the rule of law—
or “the objective of giving meaningful direction to human effort”291—to 
new and changing circumstances. 
 
286  E.g., Brilmayer, supra note 157, at 1297 (setting out a “political rights model of choice of law”). 
287  Id. at 1280 (“By and large, [political rights] are rights to be left alone.”). 
288  For an innovative analysis of choice of law using an economic perspective, see Andrew T. 
Guzman, Choice of Law: New Foundations, 90 GEO. L.J. 883 (2002). 
289  See Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Regime Collisions: The Vain Search for 
Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 999, 1002 (2004) (translated by 
Michelle Everson) (observing that lawyers’ fragmentation critiques “identify a danger to the unity of 
international law because the conceptual-doctrinal consistency, the clear hierarchy of norms and the 
effective judicial hierarchy that was developed within the nation-states, is lacking”). 
290  I have ideas, probably hinted at already supra Part III.A and III.D, on how these types of issues 
can and should be analyzed. I will take up the questions in other articles—perhaps as installments with 
this Article being Spatial Legality, Part I: Fair Notice, the next being Spatial Legality, Part II: 
Compliance, and the next after that being Spatial Legality, Part III: Consistency. 
291  See FULLER, supra note 5, at 66. 
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